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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4465
China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the 
findings in the finance and growth literature since, 
despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one 
of the fastest growing economies in the world. The 
fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as 
evidence that it is alternative financing and governance 
mechanisms that support China’s growth. This paper 
takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth 
using a database of 2,400 Chinese firms. The authors 
find that a relatively small percentage of firms in the 
sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater 
reliance on informal sources. However, the results suggest 
that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to study the role of formal versus informal finance in development. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at ayaptenco@worldbank.org. 
financial system is associated with faster firm growth, 
whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. 
Using a selection model, the authors find no evidence 
that these results arise because of the selection of firms 
that have access to the formal financial system. Although 
firms report bank corruption, there is no evidence that 
it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the 
performance of firms that receive the credit. The findings 
suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based 
financing and governance mechanisms in financing 
the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be 
overestimated.  
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   2
Introduction 
 
  Financial development has been shown to be associated with faster growth and 
improved allocative efficiency.
1 While the research focus has been on formal financial 
institutions, the literature has recognized the existence and role played by informal 
financial systems, especially in developing economies.
2  The dominant view is that 
informal financial institutions play a complementary role to the formal financial system 
by servicing the lower end of the market - informal financing typically consists of small, 
unsecured, short term loans restricted to rural areas, agricultural contracts, households, 
individuals or small entrepreneurial ventures. Informal financial institutions rely on 
relationships and reputation and can more efficiently monitor and enforce repayment 
from a class of firms than commercial banks and similar formal financial institutions 
can.
3 According to this view however, informal financial systems cannot substitute for 
formal financial systems because their monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are ill-
equipped to scale up and meet the needs of the higher end of the market.
4  
                                                 
1 This literature includes cross-country studies (King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Levine, 
Loazya and Beck, 2000; and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001 and 2005), firm level studies (Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Love, 2003; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005), industry level 
studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 2006) and 
individual country case studies (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2002 in Italy and Bertrand, Schoar and 
Thesmar, 2004 in France) 
2 By informal financial institutions, we refer to the entire gamut of non-market institutions such as credit 
cooperatives, moneylenders, etc. that do not rely on formal contractual obligations enforced through a 
codified legal system.  
3 A large economics literature has also argued that informal institutions have a comparative advantage in 
monitoring (the peer monitoring view as in Stiglitz (1990) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991)) and enforcement 
capacity.  Theoretically the informal sector has been modeled as both, a competitor to its formal 
counterpart (as in Bell et al., 1997; Jain, 1999; Varghese, 2005) as well as a channel of formal funds, where 
informal lenders who offer credit acquire formal funds to service entrepreneurs’ financing needs (Floro and 
Ray, 1997; Bose, 1998; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998). Both strands of literature emphasize that informal lenders 
hold a monitoring advantage over the formal lender.  
4 There is a direct parallel with the prevalence of angel finance in the US. Business angels are typically 
wealthy individuals who provide the initial funding to young new firms with modest capital requirements.. 
However, Lerner (1998) argues that there is no evidence that angel financing generates positive financial 
returns or improves social welfare.    3
More recently, studies have emphasized the critical role played by informal 
networks and financial channels even in developed markets. Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2004) show that social capital affects the level of financial development across 
different regions of Italy and is particularly important when legal enforcement is weaker 
and among less educated people who have limited understanding of contracting 
mechanisms. Gomes (2000) investigates why minority shareholders invest in IPOs in 
environments with poor investor protection rights and concludes that controlling 
shareholders commit implicitly not to expropriate them because of reputation concerns. 
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003) show that even in the United States, informal networks 
play an important role in controlling access to finance. Using the commercial real estate 
market as an example they show that brokers serve an important role in providing clients 
access to finance and that brokers and banks develop informal networks that have a 
significant effect on availability of finance. While the above work shows the existence of 
informal networks alongside formal systems, a controversial extension of this literature 
has been recent work by Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005), Tsai (2002), and Linton (2006) 
who argue that private sector firms in China, despite facing weaker legal protections and 
poorer access to finance than firms in the state and listed sectors, are the fastest growing 
due to their reliance on alternative financing and governance mechanisms.
5 Allen, Qian, 
and Qian (2005) further suggest that China may be an important counter-example to the 
law and finance literature’s focus on formal systems since the fastest growing Chinese 
firms rely on alternative financing channels rather than formal external finance.  
                                                 
5 Besley and Levenson (1996) have also argued that economies like Taiwan (China) grew despite an 
underdeveloped formal financial sector due to informal institutions.   4
  In this paper, we use detailed firm level survey data on 2400 firms in China to 
investigate which of the two views are consistent with the operation of the informal 
sector in China. Is the informal sector associated with high growth and profit 
reinvestment and serve as a substitute to the formal financial system or does the informal 
sector primarily serve the lower end of the market?  To answer this question, we first 
investigate whether Chinese firms’ financing patterns are different when compared to 
those of similar firms in other countries that have been the focus of the prior literature. 
Next, we explore how the financing patterns, both formal and informal, vary across 
different types of firms across cities and regions. We then study how bank finance and 
financing from informal sources are associated with firm sales growth, productivity 
growth and profit reinvestment. 
  We address these issues using a new data source, the Investment Climate Survey
6, 
a major firm level survey conducted in China in 2003 and led by the World Bank. The 
survey has information on financing choices for firms across 18 different cities. One of 
the strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises. Hence, in 
addition to information on commercial financing sources such as bank finance, the survey 
also includes information on sources of financing that are associated with small firm 
finance such as trade credit and finance from informal sources such as a money lender or 
an informal bank or other financing sources.  
  We find that 20% of firm financing in our sample is sourced from banks, which is 
comparable to the use of bank financing in other developing countries such as India, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Nigeria and the Russian Federation. However, the 
                                                 
6 Other studies using the investment climate survey data on China include Cull and Xu (2005), Dollar et al. 
(2004).   5
breakdown of non-bank financing sources shows greater differences. Compared to other 
countries, firms in our sample rely on a large informal sector and alternative financing 
channels as suggested by Allen et al. (2005). These other financing sources could well be 
the large underground lending in China, which represents several hundred billion dollars 
in bank deposits according to a recent McKinsey report (Farrell et al. (2006)).  
   At the firm level, we find that bank financing is more prevalent with larger firms 
as expected.
7 We also find substantial firm level heterogeneity in financing patterns 
within China. The firms in the sample come from five different regions of China: Coastal, 
Southwest, Central, Northwest, and Northeast. The financing patterns show that the 
largest amount of bank financing is in the Coastal (23.3%) and Southwest regions (26%) 
that have an investment climate that facilitates access to formal sources of external 
finance.  
  We find that firms using formal bank finance grow faster than those financed 
from alternative channels. Our results hold even when we exclude firms registered as 
publicly traded companies or state owned companies and look at a sample of just private 
sector firms, which are the fastest growing firms in the Chinese economy. We also find 
that firms financed by formal bank finance experience higher reinvestment rates, and 
productivity growth at least equal to that of firms financed from non-bank sources. This 
suggests that the growth financed by banks is not inefficient growth.  
  The paper’s results do not rely on establishing causality since even if it were the 
case that fastest growing firms are bank financed, then by revealed preference we know 
that at the margin banks are a better alternative to informal finance for fast growing firms. 
                                                 
7 Note that the large firms in our sample might be equivalent to small and medium enterprises in other 
economies.   6
However, we use a full battery of alternative specifications, a selection model, 
instrumental variables estimators and a matching estimator, to empirically test for the 
possibility that firms that obtain bank loans grow less fast than similar firms that rely on 
informal or other sources of financing. We find that, controlling for the endogeneity of 
the bank financing decision, bank finance is associated with higher sales growth and 
profit reinvestment.  Controlling for perceived imperfections in the allocation of bank 
loans such as corruption among bank officers and importance of government help in 
obtaining loans in the selection models strengthens the effect of bank financing on firm 
performance. When we estimate a matching model, again we find that conditional on 
firm characteristics such as size, age, legal status, ownership and city location, bank 
financed firms grow faster and reinvest more compared to non-bank financed firms. 
  We also directly compare the performance of firms which report bank loans with 
that of firms that rely on external financing from informal sources.  Firms which rely on 
informal external financing have lower profit reinvestment rates and do not grow faster or 
have higher productivity growth than firms that are bank financed.  Only when informal 
financing is defined, as in Allen et al (2005), to include internal financing, is informal 
financing associated with higher productivity growth and reinvestment (but not higher 
growth). 
  While we find the majority of firms that receive bank loans grow faster as a result, 
we do find a subpopulation of firms that do not. Firms that report that government help 
was instrumental in obtaining a bank loan, about 16% of the sample, do not show 
improvements in growth, reinvestment or productivity. However, these results do not   7
make China an exception to the growth and finance literature. They are consistent with 
the work on socialized banks by La Porta et al. (2002) and Cole (2007).  
  Overall, our results suggest that even in fast growing economies like China where 
the formal financial system serves a small portion of the private sector, external finance 
from the formal financial system is associated with faster growth and higher profit 
reinvestment rates for those firms that receive it. We find no evidence that alternative 
financing channels are associated with higher growth.  While we have some limited 
evidence that informal finance might help the smallest micro sized firms, we find that all 
firms irrespective of size, benefit from access to formal finance.  Our findings suggest 
that the role of reputation and relationship based informal financing and governance 
mechanisms in supporting the growth of private sector firms is likely to be limited and 
unlikely to substitute for formal mechanisms. 
  We discuss the Chinese economy and its financial system in detail in Section 2. In 
Section 3 we describe the survey data and summary statistics and in Section 4 we present 
our empirical model. Section 5 presents our regression results, Section 6 discusses the 
results, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Chinese Financial System 
  The Chinese financial system is characterized by a large and dominant banking 
sector that is predominantly state owned.
8  Consequently, a large share of bank funding 
                                                 
8 The banking sector is dominated by four large state owned banks that have historically had their own 
specialized role: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (provides working capital loans to state 
industrial enterprises), China Agriculture Bank (specializes in agricultural lending), China Construction 
Bank (provides funds for construction and fixed asset investment) and the Bank of China (specializes in 
trade finance and foreign-exchange transactions). While the above banks have ceased to be specialized 
sector-wise in recent years, there continues to be a large sectoral bias in their loan portfolios. In addition to 
the big four state-owned commercial banks, there are also several minor players that include Policy banks   8
goes to state controlled companies, regardless of their profitability, leaving companies in 
the private sector credit constrained. Lending by banks is also hampered by the lack of 
adequate information on borrowers’ credit histories and financial performance, making 
lending to SOEs seem a low-risk option, given their government backing. The pervasive 
state ownership of the banking sector has resulted in a huge ratio of non-performing loans 
to total loans, poor profitability, poor institutional framework of the banking system, and 
weak corporate governance. Banking depth in fact seems to be negatively correlated with 
inter-provincial differences in growth rates as shown by Boyreau-Debray (2003) and 
Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005).  
However, the inefficiency of Chinese bank lending should not be overstated, 
especially for recent years since there has been a massive restructuring of the banking 
sector, including allowing entry of foreign banks, both to prepare the banks for equity 
listings and strategic sales and as a condition of China’s accession to the WTO.  Using 
firm-level survey data, Cull and Xu (2000, 2003) find that bank finance was associated 
with higher subsequent firm productivity, while government transfers were not.  In 
addition, some analysts (Anderson, 2006) have argued that while the banking system is 
characterized by a short tail of corporate customers, the Chinese banks do not 
discriminate against private borrowers per se but do discriminate against small borrowers, 
including smaller SOEs, without visible cash flow. More recently, the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission has passed new laws encouraging banks to lend to small and 
medium enterprises.
9   
                                                                                                                                                 
(eg: Export-Import Bank of China), Second-tier Commercial banks (eg: CITIC Industrial Bank) and Trust 
and Investment Corporations (ITICs) who capture smaller portions of the lending market. 
9 In July 2007, the China Banking Regulatory Commission promulgated the Guidelines on Banks’ Credit 
Businesses to Small Enterprises, geared towards improving loan services to small and medium enterprises.    9
  While China’s banking system is large, its equity and bond markets are smaller 
than most of the other countries, both in terms of market capitalization and total value 
traded as a percentage of GDP. The equity markets are largely a vehicle for privatization 
by the government rather than a market for capital raising by firms with growth 
opportunities, as shown in Wang, Xu, and Zhu (2004).  The corporate bond market in 
China is crippled by excessive government regulation and the lack of institutional 
investors and credit rating agencies to help price the debt accurately. Durnev, Li, Morck, 
and Yeung (2004) show that compared to other transition economies, China has one of 
the poorest functioning stock markets with highly synchronous stock returns that can be 
linked to weak property rights, corporate opacity and political rent-seeking.     
  Given the state of China’s banking system and capital markets, several 
researchers including Tsai (2002) and Allen et al (2006) have argued that curb market 
finance has played a significant role in the Chinese economy by serving the needs of the 
private entrepreneurs who have been shut out of the formal banking system. In addition 
to the informal associations, there are also private money houses and underground 
lending organizations who function like banks but charge very high interest rates as 
suggested by Farrell et al. (2006). While these are technically illegal since they charge 
interest rates above the state-mandated interest rate ceilings, Tsai (2002) argues that in 
reality, most forms of informal finance that private entrepreneurs use fall into the realm 
of quasi-legality. They are not sanctioned by the People's Bank of China but are legally 
registered by another government agency within China.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Some of these improvements include assessing borrower repayment capacity in terms of available cash 
flow with less emphasis on formal collateral, requirement on all banks to set up a separate business 
department to undertake small business lending, and emphasis on achieving commercial sustainability as 
the primary goal rather than the historically subsidy-oriented approach to promoting small business finance.   10
  While the informal financing system in China has an important niche in the 
market, it also has a dark side to it. Curb market lending comes at a high cost to 
individual borrowers and ranges from legal to quasi-legal to highly illegal. It is therefore 
interesting to examine if it is the informal institutions or the formal banking sector that is 
associated with faster growth. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
  The data on Chinese firms come from the World Bank Investment Climate survey 
which was undertaken in early 2003 in collaboration with the Enterprise Survey 
Organization of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The Chinese survey is part of 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys which use standardized survey instruments and a 
uniform sampling methodology to benchmark the investment climate of countries across 
the world and to analyze firm performance. The Enterprise Surveys sample from the 
universe of registered businesses and follow a stratified random sampling methodology.  
  The firms are randomly surveyed from both manufacturing and services 
industries
10 with a restriction on minimum firm size where firm size is defined by number 
of employees. The minimum number of employees was set at 20 for manufacturing firms, 
and at 15 employees for services firms.  
  Twenty four hundred firms were sampled from the following18 cities in order to 
represent the five main regions in China: (i) Northeast: Benxi, Dalian, Changchun, and 
Haerbin; (ii) Coastal: Hangzhou, Wenzhou, Shenzhen, and Jiangmen; (iii) Central: 
                                                 
10 The industries sampled include both manufacturing (apparel and leather goods, electronic equipment, 
electronic components, consumer products, vehicles and vehicle parts) and services (accounting and related 
services, advertising and marketing, business logistics services, communication services, and information 
technology services).    11
Nanchang, Zhenzhou, Wuhan, and Changsha; (iv) Southwest: Nanning, Guiyang, 
Chongqing, and Kunming; and (v) Northwest: Xi’an and Langzhou.  Figure 1 shows a 
map of the different cities and the regions from where the firms were sampled.
11    
   The survey questionnaire has two main sections. The first section consists of 
questions on general information about the firm, its relations with clients and suppliers, 
its relations with the government, and qualitative questions asking for the manager’s 
opinion on the business environment. The second section is based on interviews with the 
firm’s accountant and personnel manager, asking for balance sheet information and other 
quantitative information on employee training, schooling, and wages.  While most of the 
qualitative questions pertain only to the year 2002, a short panel from 1999 to 2002 is 
available for the quantitative questions.  
  The survey allows us to identify firms on the basis of their registration status as 
corporations, state owned companies, cooperatives and other legal structures. In addition, 
each firm also provides a detailed breakdown of its ownership structure into domestic 
versus foreign owners as well as a more disaggregated breakdown into percentage owned 
by individuals, managers, institutional investors, firms and banks.  
 
3.1. Financing Patterns: China Compared to Other Countries.  
  Enterprise managers in the survey were asked: “Please identify the contribution of 
each of the following sources of financing for your establishment’s new investments (i.e. 
new land, buildings, machinery and equipment).” The sources are internal financial 
                                                 
11 In an earlier phase of the survey in 2001, firms were sampled from following 5 Chinese cities: Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu. We do not use these cities in our paper since the time period 
over which the information is available is different (1998-2000 as opposed to 2000-2002). In addition, 
firms in the first phase survey were not asked detailed information about their financing patterns.    12
sources such as retained earnings or loans from family and friends, and external financial 
sources such as equity, local commercial banks, foreign owned commercial banks, trade 
credit (supplier or customer credit), investment funds or special development financing, 
informal sources such as a moneylender or an informal bank and other sources. The sum 
of these proportions adds up to 100 percent.  
  We adopt two different categorizations of the various sources of financing. In the 
first categorization, we have the following six groups : Bank Financing that includes 
Local commercial banks and Foreign commercial banks; Informal Finance that includes 
financing from informal sources such as a money lender or an informal bank; Operations 
Finance that includes Trade Credit; Equity Finance; Investment Funds that includes 
Investment funds or Special Development Financing or other State Services and Internal 
Finance that includes Internal Funds or Retained Earnings, Loans from Family and 
Friends and the Other category.  
  In the second categorization, we adopt Allen et al. (2006)’s classification of 
financing sources into two groups: Bank Finance, that includes Local commercial banks 
and Foreign commercial banks and Self Fund Raising that includes all other sources 
such as retained earnings, informal sources, loans from family and friends, trade credit, 
investment funds, equity and the other category. 
12 One limitation of our survey data is 
that financing patterns are given in terms of proportions of financing, not as debt to asset 
ratios, as is common in the previous literature.  
                                                 
12 Allen et al. (2006) consider two additional financing sources that we do not have information on in our 
survey: the state budget and foreign investment. This is unlikely to influence our results on bank finance 
and informal finance since we have only 116 firms in our sample that have more than 50% foreign 
ownership and as Allen et al. themselves mention, the state budget contributes to only 10% of state owned 
companies’ total funding.   13
  In Table 1, we compare firm-level financing patterns in China with other 
developing countries in the world. The data for the countries are obtained from other 
Investment Climate Surveys (ICS).
13 As of 2006, there were 67 country surveys covering 
over 40,000 firms. Since the core survey instrument is the same across all countries, we 
have comparable information on financing sources across the different countries. The 
only difference is some surveys also have information on leasing arrangements and credit 
card financing which is not provided in the case of China. We combine these two 
categories along with Trade Credit and label it Operations Finance in our tables.   
In panel A of Table 1, we present individual financing patterns and in panel B we 
present aggregate financing patterns. In both panels, we compare firm-level financing 
patterns (averaged across all firms) in China with those in other emerging markets such 
as Bangladesh, Brazil, India,
14 Indonesia, Nigeria, and the Russian Federation. Panel A 
shows that China has the least amount of Internal financing/Retained Earnings (only 
15.24%) compared to all the other emerging markets. On the other hand, China also has 
the highest average amount of Other Financing (42.70%) compared to the other 
developing countries. The next largest dependence on Other Financing is in Indonesia, 
but even there, only 8.8% of new investments are financed by Other sources. These other 
financing sources could well represent the large underground informal lending in China, 
which represents several hundred billion dollars in bank deposits according to a recent 
                                                 
13 The Investment Climate Surveys are an on-going initiative by the World Bank to study the investment 
climate conditions in developing countries and their impact on firm productivity, investment and 
employment. 
14 The information on financing choices for Indian firms comes from the World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES) which was also conducted by the World Bank as a precursor to the Investment Climate 
Surveys. The Indian ICS does not have detailed information on firm financing choices.    14
McKinsey report (Farrell et al. (2006)) and as suggested in Allen et al. (2006).
15 However, 
the use of funds from Family and Friends and Informal lending sources such as money 
lender or informal banks seems to be comparable with its use in other countries.  
China also looks unique in the large usage of Equity financing (12.39%) 
compared to the other developing countries (all below 5%). However, when we look 
across other geographic regions, the East Asia and Pacific region (excluding China) uses 
the largest amount of Equity financing (21.38%) compared to other regions (below 5%). 
Our data on China allow for a more detailed breakdown of the equity issuance into sale of 
stock to employees, public issue of marketable shares to outside investors and sale of 
stock to legal persons. The sale of stock to employees and public issuance of marketable 
shares to outside investors is quite low at 2.89% and 1.26% respectively and most of the 
equity issuance is really sale of stock to legal persons (8.24%). Legal Person shareholders 
are unique to China and are analogous to institutional shareholders in western economies 
except that they tend to have strong state linkages
16 and are not widely held as in western 
economies. 
  In panel B, we look at the aggregate financing patterns. When we look at Internal 
Financing, which includes Retained Earnings, loans from Family/Friends and Other 
sources, Chinese firms look comparable to firms in other countries. Focusing on the 
                                                 
15 It could be that the Other Sources in China are actually Internal Funds/Retained Earnings that are mis-
classified. While we don’t have a detailed breakdown of what these Other sources could be for all firms, 
the responses from the 100 firms that do report the exact type of Other Financing suggest that there could 
be some mis-classification.  
16 The legal person identity was created to aid the transition of China's companies from state-owned to 
private-owned since the private sector did not have enough capital to acquire large tranches of state 
shareholdings. As described in Xu and Wang (1997) and Delios and Wu (2005), the legal person 
shareholder category comprises private companies, state-owned enterprises and non-bank ﬁnancial 
institutions such as investment funds and security companies. The legal person shareholders differ from 
pure state shareholders in that they are proﬁt seeking, and have relatively more freedom than state 
shareholders in deciding how to allocate proﬁts and formulate and implement ﬁrm strategy.    15
Allen et al. (2005) categorization, Chinese firms source 20% of their funds from banks 
and the remaining 80% from self fund raising channels. These numbers are very similar 
to the averages for countries in Africa (Bank financing=19%, Self Fund Raising = 81%), 
South Asia (Bank financing=23%, Self Fund Raising=77%) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Bank financing=21%, Self Fund Raising=79%). Countries in East Asia and 
the Pacific use slightly more Bank financing (32%) and lesser amount of Self Fund 
Raising (68%) compared to China where as countries in East Europe and Central Asia 
and those in Middle East and North Africa use lesser Bank financing (13%) and greater 
Self Fund Raising (87%) than even China.  
  The financing numbers are consistent when we look across country-income 
groups. Use of Bank financing ranges from 18% in the Low Income and Middle Income 
countries to 21% in High Income countries and use of Self Fund Raising is between 79-
83% across all country income groups. Overall, these figures suggest that Chinese firms 
are not an anomaly in their use of Self Fund Raising compared to other developing 
countries in contrast to the findings in Allen et al (2006). 
17 
 
3.2. Financing Patterns across Firms in China 
 
  Table 2 shows how financing patterns vary across different types of firms in 
China. The five different regions, from which firms were sampled in the survey, vary 
                                                 
17 When we re-compute Table 1 for three different size classes (1-19 employees, 20-99 employees, and 100 
and over employees) Chinese firms in each size class use less of internal financing and more of other 
financing compared to similar sized firms in the other emerging markets. However they are similar in their 
use of bank financing compared to firms from other emerging markets in the same size class. When we 
look at aggregate financing patterns, small firms in China use 10.2% bank financing (region averages for 
small firms range from 6.4 % in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) to 18.5% in Latin America and the 
Caribbean(LCR)), medium firms in China use 17.3% bank financing (region averages for medium firms 
range from 9.51% in Middle East and North Africa (MNA) to 33.55% in East Asia and Pacific (EAP) 
region, excluding China) and large firms in China use 28% bank financing (region averages for large firms 
range from 13.71% in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) to 45% in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), 
excluding China).    16
considerably in their investment climate. According to Dollar et al. (2004), the eastern 
and coastal areas (Yangtze and Pearl River deltas) are more developed; inland cities 
especially in the West and the Northeast tend to have worse investment climates. Cities in 
the central region appear to be in the middle in terms of their investment climate. The 
financing patterns seem to be correlated with the quality of investment climate, with the 
largest amount of Local Bank financing being used in the Southwest (26%) and Coastal 
(23%) regions and the least amount being used in the Northwest (14%).  
Panel A presents individual financing patterns and shows that there is substantial 
variation in financing patterns across different types of cities. Overall, there is very little 
use of formal external finance via banks or equity. For instance, the use of Local Bank 
financing is a mere 3.98% in the city of Haerbin (Heilongjiang province) in the Northeast 
region compared to 35.13% in Jiangmen which is in the coastal province of Guangdong. 
Jiangmen also has the highest amount of Foreign Bank financing, though it is a mere 
1.57%. Wenzhou, another coastal city has the highest amount of Equity financing (40%) 
and also the lowest amount of Other financing (3.38%). The use of Investment funds and 
Operations finance is generally low (<4%) across the different cities and firms in several 
cities like Wenzhou and Wuhan use no trade credit or investment funds.  
  When we look at sources other than formal finance, we find that the use of 
Retained Earnings varies from 8% in Benxi in the northeast province to over 26% in 
Changchun, also in the northeast province. The use of funds from Family and Friends 
ranges from less than 1% in Guiyang and Shenzhen to over 11% in Lanzhou, Nanning 
and Wenzhou. Benxi, Wuhan, and Chongqing have the highest amount of Informal 
financing (4-6%). The use of Other financing is typically high in most cities ranging from   17
22% in Kunming to 70% in Shenzhen except for firms in Wenzhou where the average 
Other financing is only 3.38%. 
18  It is interesting that Shenzhen records the highest 
amount of Other financing since this city is located in the Guangdong province which has 
the highest number of private enterprises including underground lending organizations as 
suggested by the McKinsey study.  
  Looking at aggregate financing patterns in panel B, the use of Internal funds 
ranges from 46% in Benxi to 81% in Zhengzhou. When we use the Allen et al. (2005) 
categorization, we find that several cities have in excess of 90% of their financing 
coming from sources other than banks. Figure 2 reveals the financing patterns across the 
different cities in increasing order of their use of bank financing. Figure 2 shows that 
after Internal funds, firms use Equity or Bank finance. Use of informal sources, 
investment funds and operations finance is very low. We control for the variation in 
financing patterns across different cities in our regressions using city dummies. 
  Table 2 also shows that the very large firms use more of Bank financing (30%) 
than the micro and small firms (14-15%). Publicly listed companies finance a little over 
33% of their new investments through Bank Financing and 67% from Self Fund Raising 
sources. By contrast, cooperatives fund only 18% of their new investments from banks 
and 82% from sources other than banks. When we look at ownership, domestic private 
firms use 20% Bank financing and 80% Self Fund Raising compared to state firms that 
use 26% Bank financing and 74% Self Fund Raising. In both cases, Other makes up a 
bulk of the Self Fund Raising. Older firms (firms > 20 years) use more of Bank financing 
                                                 
18 Four of the 18 cities were designated as export processing zones- Shenzhen, Dalian, Hangzhou, and 
Wuhan. Their use of Other Financing ranges from 24% in Hangzhou to over 70% in Shenzhen suggesting 
that Other might also be funds from overseas investments (Hong Kong, Taiwan (China), Macao).    18
(27%) compared to firms less than 5 years old which depend on Self Fund Raising for 
80% of their financing needs. 
 
3.3 Access to Formal Bank Finance 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the summary statistics for various measures that 
measure firms’ access to the formal and informal financial systems in China.  As the 
main independent variable of interest, we have an indicator variable, Bank Dummy 
showing whether the firm has access to the formal financial system. Bank Dummy takes 
the value 1 if the firm states that is has a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if 
the firm states that it has no bank loan and no overdraft facility or line of credit. We also 
construct an Access Dummy, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had 
access to a bank loan in any year prior, from 1990-2001, and 0 otherwise.  
We also consider alternative indicators of access based on the financing 
proportions of new investments that firms report. Bank Financing Dummy takes the 
value 1 if the firm states that it has a loan from a bank or financial institution and reports 
that bank finances at least 50% of new investments or that bank financing of working 
capital was greater than 50%. Bank Financing takes the value 0 if the firm states that it 
has no loan from a bank or financial institution or said it had no overdraft facility or line 
of credit and the bank financing of new investments was equal to 0% and bank financing 
of working capital was equal to 0%. Thus, a firm is assigned a value of 1 for Bank 
Financing only if we have evidence of substantial reliance on bank financing and a value 
of 0 if it does not rely on bank financing.   19
We also employ two measures of self financing. Self Financing1 takes the value 
1 if the sum of Informal financing and Other financing of either new investments or 
working capital is greater than 50%. Self Financing1 takes the value 0 if the sum of 
informal and other financing of new investments and working capital is equal to 0 %. Self 
Financing2 broadens the definition of self financing and takes the value 1 if the sum of 
Internal, Family, Informal, and Other financing of new investments or working capital is 
greater than 50%. We combine retained earnings with external informal sources in Self 
Financing2 only to be consistent with Allen et al. (2005). 
In most of our regressions we focus on the Bank Dummy variable since it is 
clearly defined and is not subject to any mis-classification error. The summary statistics 
for the three bank variables, Bank Dummy, Access Dummy and Bank Financing indicate 
that on average only 23-28% of the firms in the sample have access to bank financing. 
For instance, according to the Bank Dummy, only 537 out of the 2326 firms answering 
the bank loan question reported having a bank loan. Of the full sample of 2400 firms, 
1466 firms report one of two reasons for not having an existing loan - 1237 firms report 
not applying for a bank loan and 229 firms report not having a bank loan because their 
application for a bank loan was rejected. When we look at firms that are not registered as 
publicly traded corporations or as state owned enterprises, of the 1666 private firms, 1301 
firms reported not having an existing loan from a bank or a financial institution, 933 
private firms reported not having a bank loan because they did not apply for the loan and 
154 private firms reported not having a bank loan because their application for a bank 
loan was rejected.    20
  The firms that report their loan application was rejected report three mutually 
exclusive reasons for why their application was rejected: Lack of collateral, Perceived 
lack of feasibility of project and Incompleteness of application. Figure 3 shows that of the 
229 firms that report their loan application being rejected, 66% (152 firms) report lack of 
collateral as the main reason why their loan was rejected. This includes 104 private sector 
firms out of a sample of 154 private sector firms that report their loan application was 
rejected.  
  Thus we are able to identify firms that that may or may not need bank financing 
but do not apply for loans as well as firms that apply for loans but have their loan 
applications rejected.  The summary statistics also show that collateral seems to be main 
constraint for access to bank loans.  
 
3.4. Firm Performance and Control Variables 
  Our principal measure firm of performance is Sales Growth which is computed 
as the log change in firm sales over the period 2001-2002. We supplement sales growth 
with two additional indicators. We measure Labor Productivity Growth over the period 
2001-2002 and the firm’s reinvestment rate in 2002. Labor Productivity Growth is the log 
change in labor productivity over the period 1999 to 2002 where labor productivity is 
defined as (Sales-Total Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Reinvestment Rate is 
the manager’s estimate of the percentage of net profits that are re-invested in the 
establishment and not distributed to owners, the state or the shareholders. Productivity 
Growth shows whether a source of financing is associated with declines in firm 
efficiency. The firm’s reinvestment rate shows whether the firm’s managers are   21
committing the firm’s resources to finance growth, or whether external financing is used 
to substitute for internal resources. The latter case would be suggestive of inefficient 
investment.  
  We also consider firm performance over a longer horizon by looking at Sales and 
Productivity growth over the period 1999 to 2002. As robustness we also compute 
Growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as the log change in TFP between 2001 and 
2002. TFP is computed as the residual from a regression of Value Added on Labor 
interacted with industry sector dummies and Fixed Assets interacted with industry sector 
dummies. Value added is defined as Sales-Total Material Costs, Labor is the total number 
of employees and Fixed Assets serves as a proxy for capital. We do not use Growth in 
TFP as the main productivity growth measure in all our regressions since the sample size 
is reduced by more than half with this measure.  
The mean Sales growth rate across the full sample of firms from 2001 to 2002 is 
5.6% where as Labor Productivity growth is 0.45%. The corresponding figures for the 
period 1999 to 2002 are 13.3% and 8.1% respectively. The mean Growth in TFP over the 
period 2001-2002 is -1.92%. 
In addition to the rich detail on the financing choices of firms, the survey has 
information on firm size, age, ownership, legal organization and capacity utilization, all 
of which are used as firm level controls in our study. An important strength of the survey 
is its wide coverage of micro and small size firms.
19  We construct Size Dummies which 
are the quintiles of firm’s sales in 1999. The survey thus provides data across a much 
                                                 
19 The mean (median) number of employees in a firm in our sample in 1999 was 579 (100) employees with 
33% of our sample composed of firms with less than 50 employees.   22
broader cross-section of firm sizes than is available in commercial data bases, such as 
Worldscope. 
  Panel A of Table 3 shows that the average firm age in the sample is 16 years. We 
include dummy variables to identify very young firms (1-5 years), middle-aged firms (5-
20 years) and older firms (>20 years). The firms in the survey are broadly classified in 
terms of their current legal status into corporations, cooperatives and an other category. 
Corporations, both public and private, make up 40% of our sample where as 16% of our 
sample is composed of Cooperatives or Collectives. We also have detailed information 
on the ownership breakdown of these companies and the percentage owned by different 
entities in the private sector (eg: domestic firms, domestic institutional investors, foreign 
individuals, foreign firms, foreign institutional investors, etc) and different entities in the 
state sector (e.g.: national government, state/provincial government, local/municipal 
government or other government bodies like collectives, etc). We use a dummy variable 
State Ownership to characterize firms where the government owns more than 50% of 
the company. Nearly 22% of the sample (531 firms) is composed of firms with more than 
50% state ownership and the remaining is made up of firms with more than 50% private 
ownership. We also identify the number of competitors of the firm in its main business 
line in the domestic market by using five Competition dummies for 1-3 competitors, 4-6 
competitors, 7-15 competitors, 16-100 competitors and over 100 competitors respectively. 
  Panel B of Table 3 presents the correlation between the access variables and firm 
performance.  We find that the bank finance variables are all significantly correlated with 
each other and in fact Bank Dummy and Bank Financing dummy, where the latter 
variable takes into account bank financing of new investments and working capital are   23
perfectly correlated. Bank Financing and Bank Dummy are also positively correlated 
with the firm performance measures where as the Access Dummy which focuses on 
access to past bank financing appears to be negatively correlated. Both the Self Financing 
dummies are negatively correlated with all measures of bank finance and also appear to 
be negatively correlated with Sales Growth and Reinvestment rate and have a positive 
association with productivity growth.  
  The raw correlations between firm performance and the financing variables mask 
some of the underlying variation. The average 2001-2002 growth rate of firms that 
receive bank finance is 10.34% compared to an average growth rate of 4.2% for firms 
that receive no bank finance. The differences are starker when we look at the growth and 
financing figures by size quintiles. The lowest quintile of firms (with an average of only 
18 employees) has average growth rates of 10% but only 6% of these firms have bank 
loans. These firms however are typical of the fast growing micro sized firms in most 
economies which depend mainly on internal and informal sources for their growth. When 
we look at the second to fifth quintiles of firms with number of employees ranging from 
44 to 2475 employees, we see a positive association between bank finance and growth. 
The proportion of bank loans varies from 16% in the second quintile to 41% in the fifth 
quintile with the corresponding sales growth figures ranging from 0.02% to 6.9%. 
20 
To investigate if bank financing is indeed associated with better firm performance, we 
next turn to regression analysis, controlling for a number of firm level variables.  
                                                 
20 The numbers are similar when we define size in terms of total sales. The lowest quintile of firms with 
average sales around 384,000 RMB has the highest growth rates of 12% and the least amount of bank loans 
(9%). The second to the fifth quintile of firms range in sales from 2,005,000 RMB to 414,353,000 RMB 
with monotonic increases in the proportion of bank loans and sales growth with size. The proportion of 
bank loans ranges from 13% to 45% and sales growth ranges from 1.3% to 4.8% as we move from the 
second quintile to the fifth quintile of firms.   24
4. Financing Patterns and Firm Performance – Empirical Strategy 
  We first estimate the following regression model: 
Sales Growth/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α + β1Bank Dummy+ β2Firm 
Size dummies + β3 Age dummies + β4Corporations + β5Collectives + β6State Ownership 
+ β7Competition Dummies + β8City Dummies + ε                              (1) 
The bank loans for our sample were approved prior to 2002. Accordingly, we 
report regressions for which the dependent variable is sales or productivity growth rate 
between 2001 and 2002 or the reinvestment rate measured in 2002. However, because 
annual growth rates are likely to be subject to random shocks, we also report regressions 
using sales growth and productivity growth of firms for the period 1999-2002. These 
regressions are descriptive, showing the association between growth and firm access to 
the formal sector over a longer horizon. 
  Our main independent variable of interest is the Bank Dummy. We include a 
number of firm level control variables - Firm Size dummies, Age dummies, State 
Ownership dummy, Corporation dummy, Cooperatives dummy and Competition 
dummies - that are described in detail in Section 3.4. We include city dummies to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity at the city level. The data on industries are available for a 
very narrow definition of business activity giving us 81 industry dummies. Hence, while 
our results are robust to controlling for industry dummies, we do not include industry 
dummies in our baseline specification so as to not lose too many degrees of freedom. We 
also report alternative specifications using the other financing variables described in 
Section 3.3 - Access Dummy, Bank Financing Dummy, and the two informal financing 
variables, Self Financing1 and Self Financing2.    25
4.1. Endogeneity of the Bank Financing Decision   
While equation (1) establishes a broad association between formal vs. informal 
financial systems and firm performance, one of the concerns might be that a positive 
relation observed between external finance and firm growth (or a negative one between 
self fund raising and firm growth) may be simply due to reverse causality. To the extent 
that we are only interested in establishing an association between the use of bank finance 
and high growth rates, the direction of causality is immaterial. Even if it were the case 
that the fastest growing firms go to banks for financing, then by revealed preference, 
bank finance is the preferred alternative to informal finance.  
A second econometric concern might be that the bank financing decision is 
endogenous and firms self select into applying for bank loans and hence we need to 
control for selection effects. We are interested in the effect of bank financing on the 
performance of bank financed firms i.e. the difference between the performance of the 
bank financed firms and its performance if it was not bank financed. This difference is 
refereed to as the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). If Yi1 is the 
performance of the firm if it is bank financed and Yi0 is the performance if it is not bank 
financed, the ATT is given by: 
 τ|Bank=1 = E(Yi1| Banki=1) - E(Yi0| Banki= 1 )       ( 2 )  
Since we cannot observe the performance of bank financed firms if they were not 
bank financed (i.e. E(Yi0| Banki=1)), we estimate the following equation: 
τ = E(Yi1| Banki=1) - E(Yi0| Banki=0)     (3) 
Equation (3) is however a biased predictor of Equation (2) since firms may 
choose to be bank financed. The Heckman (1979) two stage model explicitly addresses   26
bias caused by correlation of the regressor with omitted variables, by adding a term to the 
regression called the inverse Mills ratio that represents the non-zero expectation of the 
error term. A common interpretation of this term is to consider it as private information 
driving the selection decision. To estimate the selection model using instrumental 
variables, we need an instrument that is correlated with bank finance at the firm level, yet 
uncorrelated with firms’ growth opportunities. 
21 One of the factors that could affect 
access to bank loan is the ability to post collateral, although the importance of collateral 
for accessing bank loans could vary according to the market environment in which the 
firm operates. Figure 3 shows that firms report the main reason why banks reject their 
loan applications is their inability to meet collateral requirements. Hence as an instrument 
for bank finance, we construct a dummy variable Collateral, which takes the value 1 if 
the firm reported that the financing required collateral and takes the value 0 if the firm 
reported that the financing did not need collateral or that it did not apply for a loan 
because of stringent collateral requirements or that it was rejected for a loan because of 
the lack of collateral. Thus Collateral serves as a proxy for the firm’s ability to post 
collateral. 
22 Ability to post collateral has been used as an instrument for bank finance in 
prior work as well including Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (1999). 
  Whether there was a collateral requirement or not is less likely to be correlated 
with firm’s growth and hence need not enter the second stage.
23 Thus, collateral serves as 
                                                 
21 See Li and Prabhala (2007) for a discussion of selection models in corporate finance. As Li and Prabhala 
(2007) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) note, strictly speaking we do not need any exclusion 
restrictions because the model is identified by non-linearity, thus allowing estimation.  
22 We find that size and possession of fixed assets are determinants of a firm’s ability to post collateral. In 
addition, there is sufficient institutional variation across provinces that affects firms’ ability to post 
collateral. We find that firms in cities with poor institutional environment but with higher fixed assets post 
more collateral. This suggests that in poor institutional environments, firms have to rely on collateral to 
access bank finance rather than relying on credit histories and growth opportunities.   
23 When we include the collateral requirement dummy in the second stage it is not statistically significant.   27
the identifying variable in our selection equation. There is a possibility that the selection 
of firms receiving bank loans may be caused by firm characteristics unobserved by us, 
but observable by banks. 
Specifically, we assume that a firm obtains access to formal bank finance (i.e. 
Bank Dummy = 1) if it meets the formal criteria of the banking system, so that the linear 
function of information observed by us and proprietary information observed by the bank 
exceeds a threshold. Therefore, Bank Dummy = 1 if  
α0 + β1 Collateral + β2Size dummies +β3 Age dummies +β4Corporations + β5Collectives 
+ β6State Ownership + β7Competition Dummies + β8City Dummies + ζ >0,                 (4)  
where ζ∼(0,σ
2) is proprietary information observed by the bank.  Equation (4) is also 
referred to as the Selection or Treatment Equation and forms the first stage of a two-stage 
selection model in which equation (5) below forms the second stage :  
Sales Growth/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α1 + γ1BankDummy+ γ2Size 
dummies+ γ3Age dummies + γ4Corporations + γ5Collectives + γ6State Ownership + 
γ7Competition Dummies + γ8City Dummies + λ + ε                        (5) 
  We first obtain estimates of the selection equation and from these estimates, the 
nonselection hazard λ (inverse of the Mill’s ratio), is computed for each observation. λ is 
an estimate of the banks’ private information underlying the selection of firms. The 
regression equation (5) is then augmented with the nonselection hazard λ which provides 
an estimate of the selection bias.  
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5. Results 
5.1. Bank Finance and Firm Performance 
  Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients from baseline regression (1).  Columns 
(1) and (7) show that the formal financial system is associated with higher sales growth 
for both the full sample of all firms and a sub-sample of private firms (dropping public 
and state owned firms). The role of bank financing in the second sub-sample is of 
particular interest, since private firms are likely to have fewer alternative options than 
publicly traded firms or state owned firms.  Firms that have bank financing also reinvest 
a higher proportion of their profits in their businesses in both samples (columns (2) and 
(8)). Thus, there is no evidence that bank financing funds growth that firms are unwilling 
to undertake using their own capital. 
Columns (3) and (8) show that bank finance is not significantly negatively 
associated with labor productivity growth. When we look at growth in TFP for a smaller 
sample of firms, again we find that bank finance is positively associated with growth in 
TFP though not significantly so. These findings suggest that the formal financial system 
rather than informal sources have a positive association with firm growth and 
reinvestment and that the growth that results is not inefficient. Columns (4) and (5) for 
the full sample, and (9) and (10) for the sub sample reinforce this finding by showing that 
the association holds over a longer horizon. 
When we look at the control variables, larger firms, older firms and firms 
organized as cooperatives or collectives are found to have lower growth rates. Growth 
rates are lower in highly competitive (>100 competitors) industries. The city dummies 
show that compared to firms in Benxi, firms in Changchun, Chongqing, Hangzhou,   29
Nanchang, Shenzen, and Wenzhou are the fastest growing over the period 1999 to 2002. 
Note that each of these cities received an investment climate score of A or A+ (except for 
Nanchang which received a score of B+) in the Dollar et al. (2004) study compared to 
Benxi which received an investment climate score of B- in the study.  When we look at 
growth rates over a smaller time horizon from 2001 to 2002, only firms in Shenzen seem 
to be growing faster than firms in Benxi. Our results in Table 4 are robust to controlling 
for 14 industry sector dummies.  
  To check whether our results are driven by outliers, we perform several 
robustness checks. We have re-estimated all our specifications by removing potential 
outliers (growth rates in excess of ± 1000%), by winsorizing the top 1% of the sales 
growth, reinvestment rate and productivity growth variables, and by using median 
regressions. Our results (not reported) remain unchanged in all cases.  The coefficients of 
Bank Dummy are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4, indicating that our earlier 
results are not driven by outliers. 
 
5.2. Bank Finance and Firm Performance - Treatment Effects  
In Table 5, we investigate the relation between bank financing and sales growth, 
reinvestment, and productivity growth, controlling for the selection of firms that obtain 
bank financing. The estimates of the selection equation (even numbered columns) 
indicate that firms that obtain formal financing are more likely to have collateral that they 
can pledge, are large companies organized as corporations, with some but relatively few 
(<6), competitors. Interestingly, although firms in highly competitive industries grow 
more slowly, there is little evidence that banks lend to them at a lower rate. The hazard   30
lambda (also referred to as the Inverse Mills Ratio) which measures the impact of self 
selection is reported at the foot of Table 5.  
In Table 5, controlling for selection, the coefficients of bank financing, are greater 
than in Table 4, for both the full sample and the private firms sub-sample. This is in part 
because banks lend disproportionately to large firms, which grow more slowly than small 
firms. Once this selection effect is controlled for, there is a stronger relation between 
bank financing and firm growth. Similarly, the coefficients of bank financing in the 
productivity regressions are larger, albeit statistically insignificant. Thus, as in Table 4, 
there is no evidence that bank financing is associated with inefficient growth.
24 
In panel A of Table 6, we consider a wider range of determinants of access to the 
formal financial sector. We examine alternative explanations for why the proportion of 
bank finance is associated with higher sales growth, profit reinvestment and productivity. 
It could be that the firms that get bank finance are the ones that are politically connected 
or have been singled out for financing (directed credit) or that firms that get bank finance 
are those that are better at bribing bank officers. Hence we introduce the following 
variables into the selection equation. We introduce a “Government Help” dummy which 
takes the value 1 if firms answer “yes” to the question “During the year 2002, did any 
government agency or official assist you in obtaining bank financing?” and a value of 
zero otherwise. As a proxy for bank corruption, we use firm responses to the following 
question “In your dealings with bank officials and loan officers, was a gift or informal 
                                                 
24 The negative coefficients of  the hazard rate lambdas in our second stage regressions suggests that firms 
which receive bank loans are predicted to perform more slowly than benchmark firms, perhaps as a result 
of unobservable private information. However, the coefficients are smaller than the positive coefficient of 
the bank loan dummy, and for the most part not significant. Thus, the evidence suggests that bank financing 
is associated with enhanced growth. 
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payment expected?”  We also measure the firm’s general perception of its property rights 
enforcement. Property Rights Protection is the firm’s estimate of the likelihood that the 
legal system will uphold the firm’s contract and property rights in business disputes.
25 
We also investigate additional firm-level variables that might affect a firm’s 
ability to obtain a loan from the formal financial sector. The dummy variable, Loan from 
Group or Holding Company, takes the value 1 if the firm is a member of a group or a 
holding company that provided loan to the firm and 0 otherwise. Loan Guarantee 
Program is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm benefited from a loan 
guarantee program offered by loan guarantee companies. Located in Export Processing 
Zone is also a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is located in an industrial 
park, science park, or export processing zone and 0 otherwise. CEO Education Level 
takes values 1 to 4 - 1 if the CEO had no formal education, 2 if the CEO had high-school, 
secondary school or primary school education, 3 if the CEO had an undergraduate 
education at home or abroad and 4 if the CEO had postgraduate education at home or 
abroad. Politically Connected CEO takes the value 1 if the CEO was a party secretary, 
deputy party secretary, party committee member or executive member or a party member 
and 0 if the CEO is not a party member. Columns 1 to 4 present results for the sales 
growth regression, columns 5 and 6 for profit reinvestment rate and columns 7 and 8 
present results for the productivity growth.  In columns 3 and 4, we also include past 
sales growth rate from 1999 to 2001 to investigate if past performance is a predictor of 
bank financing.  
                                                 
25 To the extent that property rights enforcement varies across localities, its variation will be captured by 
City Dummies. This variable captures firm-level deviations from the city-level mean as well as city-level 
deviations in firm perceptions from the city means.   32
We find evidence that firms which report government help in obtaining loans, 
report receiving loans from other firms in their group, or which are located in export 
processing zones are more likely to receive loans. While affecting the probability of a 
loan, none of these variables significantly predict increases in the firm’s growth rate, 
reinvestment rate, or productivity growth. Thus, there is no evidence that government 
help in obtaining loans is directed to firms which subsequently report better outcomes. 
However, we also find little evidence that firms which receive government help in 
obtaining loans perform less well than other firms. 
Controlling for these factors, we do not find evidence that the degree of perceived 
bank corruption, participation in loan guarantee programs, the educational level of 
general manager or reported political connections, significantly affects the probability of 
obtaining a loan. Likewise, an index of property rights does not add explanatory power. 
However the effect of the property rights could be subsumed by the size dummies since 
larger firms in our sample report higher likelihood that the legal system will uphold their 
contract and property rights in business disputes.  
We do find that firms which grew fast in 1999-2001 were more likely to have 
loans in 2001-2002 (Column 4). However, fast growth in 1999-2001 predicts slower 
growth in 2001-2002. Thus, while the banking system is more likely to lend to firms that 
grow fast, it is only those firms that the banks lend to who continue to grow fast.  
In Panel B, Table 6 we repeat our analysis of Table 5, with a broader definition of 
bank financing. Access Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had 
access to a bank loan in any year prior, from 1990-2001, and 0 otherwise. The results on 
sales growth, reinvestment and productivity growth are qualitatively similar. One   33
difference is that we find less evidence that bank access is skewed in favor of larger firms. 
This may be because small firms which do not have loans in 2001 may have obtained a 
loan in the preceding decade. Thus, these firms may have access to the formal sector but 
have a lower frequency of loans. All our results in Table 6 hold when we look at a 
smaller sample without publicly traded corporations and state owned enterprises. We do 
not report these results in the interest of space. 
 
5.3. Bank Finance and Firm Performance - Robustness 
5.3.1. Treatment Effects via Matching 
  In this section we use a second class of treatment effects estimators, matching 
models, that estimate the treatment effects as the difference in average outcomes of the 
treated (Bank Dummy =1) and control groups (Bank Dummy = 0), where the control 
group is formed by matching firms based on one or more characteristics. The idea is that 
selection bias is reduced when the comparison of outcomes is performed using treated 
and control objects who are as similar as possible. While matching methods do not 
address unobservables, they seek to do a better job of controlling for observable 
characteristics. In addition, the lack of strong distributional assumptions makes matching 
methods appropriate when the treatment and control groups are unbalanced in sample 
size. 
26 
We use Propensity Score Matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) where the 
Propensity Score is the probability of a firm obtaining bank financing given a vector of 
firm characteristics and is computed via a logit regression model. We estimate the 
                                                 
26 A potential disadvantage of the Heckman model is that it assumes a normal joint distribution for the error 
terms which is not assumed in matching estimators.   34
Propensity Score by matching on the following set of covariates: Size Dummies, Age 
Dummies, City Dummies, Corporations Dummy, Cooperatives Dummy and State 
Ownership Dummy. A test of the balancing property shows that the balancing property of 
the estimated propensity score is satisfied. i.e. firms with the same propensity score have 
the same distribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independently of 
whether or not they were bank financed. 
27 In estimating the propensity score, we impose 
the Common Support condition, which ensures that matching is only conducted over the 
overlapping region of the distributions of propensity score in the treated and untreated 
groups, thus ensuring that conditional on observed characteristics, the probability of 
being bank financed / not is non-zero. i.e. firms with the same set of characteristics have 
a positive probability of being both bank financed as well as not bank financed. Imposing 
the common support condition leaves us with 507 bank financed firms and 1615 non-
bank financed firms. Figure 4 shows the distribution of propensity scores across the two 
samples. The histograms show that most of the comparison group members have very 
low estimated probabilities of obtaining bank financing. Further, there are at least a few 
comparison observations near each treated observation.  
In Panel A of Table 7 we report the average treatment effects (ATT) on the 
treated upon implementing propensity score matching. Columns 1-3 report the results 
from using the radius matching estimator where as columns 4-6 report results from using 
                                                 
27 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that to ensure a bias reduction the propensity score should satisfy 
two important properties: Balancing Property which ensures that given the propensity score, the treatment 
and observables are independent and the Unconfoundedness Property which ensures that given the 
propensity score the treatment and the potential outcomes are independent. We use the Stata routine 
psmatch2 to estimate the propensity score and test the balancing property. Note that the unconfoundedness 
property cannot be tested.    35
the kernel matching estimator. 
28Testing the statistical significance of treatment effects 
and computing their standard errors is tricky since the estimated variance of the treatment 
effect should also include variance due to the estimation of the propensity score and the 
imputation of the common support. Hence we report bootstrapped standard errors after 50 
replications to reduce the bias in the estimates of the standard errors. Panel C shows that 
conditional on observable characteristics, bank financed firms grow faster (around 6%) 
and reinvest more (around 9%) compared to non-bank financed firms. While the ATT for 
productivity growth are positive, they are not significant. These results are robust to the 
type of matching estimator used.  
 
5.3.2. Government Help 
One of the remaining econometric concerns is that the association we observe 
between bank financing and firm performance is due to directed credit –that is the 
Chinese government directs banks to lend to certain firms with good credit ratings, thus 
affecting both the selection decision and the outcome variable. It may be noted that when 
we control for firms that report government help in obtaining bank finance in both stages 
in the treatment effects model in Table 6, we found that while the government help 
dummy predicts which firms get bank finance, government help in obtaining bank 
finance has no impact on firm performance. 
                                                 
28 Once the propensity score is estimated there are several choices for matching estimators that can be used 
to estimate treatment effects. The estimators differ in the way the neighborhood for each bank financed 
firm is defined and the common support problem is handled and the weights assigned to these neighbors. 
We use Radius matching where all the control units with estimated propensity score falling within a radius 
r from the propensity score of the bank financed firm are matched to the bank financed firm. This matching 
procedure reduces the risk of bad matches which might occur if the closest neighbor is far away. As 
robustness, we also use Kernel matching which uses weighted averages of all firms in the control group to 
construct the counterfactual outcome of a bank financed firm. Note that with radius matching only a few 
observations from the comparison group are used to construct the counterfactual.  
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We further deal with the issue of government help in two ways: First, we drop 
firms which report that they had government help in obtaining bank financing (15% of 
the overall sample) in column 1 of panel B of Table 7 and find our results to be stronger. 
When we drop firms that report government help in obtaining bank finance, we find that 
bank financed firms grow 10% faster than firms which do not have access to bank loans 
and this effect is larger than in the full sample results in Table 4 where we found that 
bank financed firms grew an average 7.5% faster than non-bank financed firms. Hence 
we have evidence that the positive association between bank finance and growth is not 
being driven by the firms that the government instructs the banks to lend to. We find 
similar effects when we look at the effect of bank finance on profit reinvestment rates and 
productivity growth but do not report these results in the interest of space. 
Second we use the government help variable explicitly in our identification 
strategy. Columns 2-4 of panel B of Table 7 presents the results of our instrumental 
variable estimation where we first instrument for bank finance using collateral, next using 
the government help dummy and finally using both collateral and government help. All 
the estimates reported are LIML estimates which are more reliable than 2SLS estimates 
in the presence of weak instruments. When we instrument for bank finance using 
collateral, the results are as expected and we find that bank finance is positively and 
significantly associated with firm growth. Note that the IV is similar to the treatment 
effects model in Table 5 except that the latter is a control function approach where we 
incorporate the Inverse Mills Ratio. When we use the government help dummy as an 
instrument for bank finance, we find that bank finance is no longer a significant predictor 
of firm growth. However when we use both collateral and government help as   37
instruments, we find that bank finance has a positive and significant effect on firm 
growth.  
In all three cases, the instruments we use pass various tests of weak instruments. 
Both the Collateral and Government help dummy are strongly positively correlated with 
Bank Dummy in the first stage (not reported) and the first stage F-stats are larger than 10 
(Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest the rule of thumb that for the case of a single 
instrument, instruments may be deemed weak if first stage F-stat is less than  ten). The 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test in columns 2 and 4 show that the OLS estimates 
are not consistent and we need IV estimates. The Over-identification test in column 6 is 
not rejected suggesting that the instruments used are valid instruments. In each column, 
we also report the conditional likelihood ratio confidence region and p-value proposed by 
Moreira (2003), both of which are robust to potentially weak instruments. The p-values 
reported test the null hypothesis that the bank dummy coefficient is zero using the 
conditional likelihood ratio test. 
These results show conclusively that the positive association between bank 
finance and sales growth in our study is not being driven by Chinese government policy 
which might instruct banks to provide financing to certain firms. In fact we have 
evidence to the contrary suggesting that the firms which receive government help in 
obtaining bank financing do not grow as fast as firms which report no government help.  
 
5.3.3. Firms That Do Not Apply for Bank Loans 
  Firms in our survey report if they did not apply for a bank loan due to several 
reasons including do not need loans, application procedures too cumbersome, stringent 
collateral requirements, high interest rates, bank corruption, or did not expect to be   38
approved. In this section we investigate if the firms which do not apply for bank loans 
due to any of the reasons listed above, perform better than firms with a bank loan. In 
Panel C of Table 7, we replicate Table 4 using a dummy variable, Did not Apply for a 
Bank loan, which takes the value 1 if the firm reported not applying for a bank loan and 0 
if the firm has a bank loan. If the dummy variable were to be positive and significant, 
then it would mean either that these firms do not have capital needs or that they are 
growing fast by sourcing their financing from non-bank sources. 
  Our results in panel C of Table 7 show that the firms which do not apply for a 
bank loan grow significantly slower and reinvest significantly less than firms with a bank 
loan. The Did not Apply for a Bank loan dummy is insignificant in the Labor 
Productivity Regressions. In unreported results we find that none of the reasons stated for 
not applying for a bank loan are ever positive and significant in any of the regression 
specifications. The firms in our sample also report if their application for a bank loan was 
rejected. Here again we find no evidence that firms rejected for a bank loan performed 
better than firms which had access to a bank loan.  
 
5.4. Financing of New Investments and Working Capital – Bank Finance vs. Informal 
Finance 
  In Table 8, panel A, we examine the association between indicators of 
performance and bank financing for those firms that explicitly report using bank 
financing to fund at least some (>0%) of their new investments or working capital. The 
coefficient estimates for the Bank Financing Dummy are shown in panel A. Since we 
have data on uses of bank financing only for 2002, we do not estimate a selection model.   39
We interpret our estimates as a consistency check on our earlier results rather than as 
evidence of a causal relationship.    
  Panel A shows that our earlier results hold for firms that report heavy use of bank 
financing to fund investment and working capital. Such firms tend to grow faster and 
reinvest more of their profits than comparable firms. This faster growth is not associated 
with slower improvements in productivity. 
  In panel B, we show the association between performance indicators and self-
financing of investment and working capital.  To recall, Self Financing1 takes the value 1 
if the firm reports that it has financed at least half of its new investments or working 
capital from informal and “other” sources. Self Financing 1 takes the value 0 if the firm 
reports not using informal or “other” financing to fund investment or working capital. To 
be consistent with Allen et al. (2005), we combine internal sources with external informal 
sources in defining Self Financing2. Self Financing2 takes the value 1 if the firm reports 
using internal, informal, family, and other financing to fund at least a half of its new 
investments or working capital. Self Financing2 takes the value 0 if the firm reports not 
using these sources to fund investment or working capital. Thus, Self Financing1, by 
excluding internal financing, places more weight on “external” informal financing, 
whereas Self Financing2 also includes funds explicitly designated as retained earnings or 
contributed by family members. 
Panel B of Table 8 shows that there is no association between firm growth and 
either measure of self-financing. The coefficients of both measures of self financing are 
negative although not significant in the sales growth regression. Interestingly, firms that 
are self-funded primarily through informal or other sources reinvest a lower proportion of   40
their earnings in their business. However, the negative association between self financing 
and profit reinvestment rates switches to positive when we incorporate internal and 
family funds as part of self financing sources. We find that it is the inclusion of internal 
financing (rather than family funds) that drives the positive association between of self 
financing and profit reinvestment rates.  
 In unreported results, when we look at the sample of firms which did not apply 
for a bank loan or who were rejected for a loan by the bank, we find no evidence that 
firms relying mostly on informal or other financing grow faster or reinvest more than 
firms using other sources of financing. The coefficients of Self Financing 1 and Self  
Financing2 are negative (but not significant) in the sales growth regressions and negative 
and significant at the 1% level in the profit reinvestment rate regressions.  If we include 
the individual components of self financing proportion in the regressions, we find that 
firms that use more of informal and other financing reinvest significantly less than the 
firms that rely on their internal funds. There is also evidence suggesting that firms relying 
on informal and other financing grow slower, though not significantly, than firms relying 
on their retained earnings. 
29  
Overall these results suggest that any positive association between non-bank 
financing and profit reinvestment rates stems from the use of retained earnings rather 
than informal sources and other alternative financing channels.  
When we use the broader definition of informal financing, Self Financing2, we 
also find that self-funded firms report higher growth in productivity. In unreported results 
we interact the self financing variable with size quintile dummies and find that it is the 
                                                 
29 The association between slow growth and dependence on informal and other sources is significant and 
strong when we look at growth over the longer time period of 1999-2002.   41
smallest quintile of firms (who we know have limited access to bank finance) who report 
productivity increases when their primary financing sources include internal, informal, 
family or other financing.  
 
6. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss our findings in the context of recent evidence on the 
link between finance and growth in China. Allen et al. (2005) find that while the Private 
Sector dominates the State and Listed sectors in both the size of the output and the 
growth trend, there is a huge reliance on non-bank financing sources amongst firms in the 
Private sector. Given the weak external markets and poor legal protection of minority and 
outside investors in China, Allen et al. (2005) attribute the growth of the Private sector to 
the reliance on alternative financing channels and corporate governance mechanisms such 
as reputation and relationships. They interpret this as evidence against the finance and 
growth literature that the development of stock markets and a banking system is 
important for growth of firms and economies. However, due to data limitations, the 
results in Allen et al. (2006) are based on an analysis of the 17 largest, and perhaps 
unrepresentative, firms in the two most developed regions in the country. Further, their 
definition of informal financing channels includes retained earnings, informal financing, 
issuance of equity and all other sources of fund raising except bank financing, state 
funding and foreign investment. 
While our data on 2400 firms (including 1720 non-publicly traded and non-state 
companies) confirm the wide use of financing channels other than Bank Finance, our 
regression results suggest that it is the formal financing channel, specifically Bank   42
Finance that is positively associated with higher growth and reinvestment. These 
increases are not associated with decreases in firm productivity. We find no evidence that 
alternative financing channels such as informal sources have a positive impact on growth 
and reinvestment or that they substitute for the formal sector. The arguments in Allen et 
al. (2005) can best be interpreted as a second best: how finance can cope with restrictions 
on entry and with pervasive state ownership of banks.   
To investigate the relation between growth and bank financing further we 
estimate a selection model which takes into account that banks may use proprietary 
information not observed by researchers to allocate credit to firms that subsequently grow 
faster. Controlling for this type of selection bias strengthens the relation between bank 
financing and subsequent growth.  
Our results are consistent with other studies emphasizing the role of institutions 
and formal finance in China. Cull and Xu (2005) find that profit reinvestment rates are 
affected by enterprise managers' perceptions about the security of property rights, the risk 
of expropriation by government officials, the efficiency and reliability of courts, and 
access to credit. In a more recent paper, Cull, Xu, and Zhu (2007) find that despite a 
biased and inefficient banking system, trade credit does not play an economically 
significant role in China. There are also more recent studies emphasizing the link 
between institutions and growth at the provincial level. Cheng and Degryse (2006) 
explore the impact of the development of bank versus non-bank financial institutions on 
the growth rate of Chinese provinces over the period 1995-2003 and conclude that only 
bank loans have a significant impact on local economic growth. Fan, Morck, Xu, and 
Yeung (2007) find that inward FDI within China flows disproportionately into provinces   43
with less corrupt governments and governments that better protect private property   
rights. 
30  
So how do we reconcile our results with the inefficiencies in the formal financial 
system described in Section 2? The formal financial system does serve a small sector of 
the economy and both the aggregate statistics and firm responses suggest that there are 
imperfections in the allocation of capital. However, our results show that despite these 
weaknesses, at the margin, private sector firms that have loans from the formal sector do 
better than other firms and having a better developed financial system will only bring 
more benefits.  
We have no evidence that the firms depending on external financing of their 
investment through informal channels are the fastest growing firms. Rather, the evidence 
suggests that, if anything, retained earnings are associated with better performance than 
external informal financing, and that firms that have bank loans grow faster than firms 
relying on informal or other sources. However, even though in the aggregate informal 
financing sources are not associated with high growth, the low reliance of very small 
firms on bank financing suggests that self financing is important for small entrepreneurial 
firms that depend on it for their growth and survival. For some of these firms, informal 
financing may play a role akin to the critical role played by angel finance, in the 
financing and creation of rapid-growth start-ups in developed economies. Thus, while the 
                                                 
30 Fan et al. (2007) estimate a cross-country (without China) FDI model explaining inward FDI using 
different measures of institutions and make out-of-sample predictions from their model for China. They 
find that China is no exception since Chinese FDI inflows are in line with what the model predicts for a 
country at China’s level of institutional development as measured by general government quality and rule 
of law.  However, when they measure institutions by “strength of executive constraints”, they find that 
China receives more FDI than predicted by their model. But they argue that this could be because of other 
reasons including underestimation of the strength of checks on executive power in China or foreign firms 
enjoying better protections than identical Chinese firms.   
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informal sector may have its own niche in financing very small firms, we find no 
evidence that it scales up and is an efficient substitute for bank financing for most firms. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  With one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world, China 
provides many puzzles.  More recently, it has been singled out as a counterexample to the 
findings of the finance and growth literature: while Chinese financial systems and 
institutions are underdeveloped, its economy, particularly its private sector, has been 
growing very fast.  One explanation for this observation has been that China has 
alternative mechanisms and institutions that play an important role in supporting its 
growth and these alternative mechanisms are good substitutes for standard corporate 
governance mechanisms and financing channels (Allen, et al. 2005).  
  In this paper we take a closer look at the financing of 2,400 Chinese firms and 
their performance, using a detailed firm level survey.  We find that in China, private 
firms’ use of formal financing channels is comparable to its use in other developing 
countries, and it is financing from these sources that is positively associated with firm 
performance.  Contrary to earlier findings, fund raising from informal channels is not 
associated with faster firm growth. To the extent that there are measurable benefits of 
informal financing, they arise only when retained earnings is classified as informal 
financing, as in some earlier studies. These findings have broader implications for the 
role of informal versus formal financial systems.  Our results contradict the belief that 
nonstandard financing mechanisms provide effective substitutes to formal financing 
channels in promoting growth.  They suggest that the role of informal relationship based   45
financing and governance mechanisms in supporting the growth of private sector firms is 
likely to be overestimated. 
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Figure 3: Reasons why loan application was rejected 
Of the full sample of 2326 firms, 1789 firms reported not having an existing loan from a bank or a financial institution.  229 firms reported not having a bank loan because their application for a bank 
loan was rejected. Of the 1666 private firms, 1301 firms reported not having an existing loan from a bank or a financial institution. 154 private firms reported not having a bank loan because their 
application for a bank loan was rejected. The firms report three reasons for having their application for a bank loan rejected: Lack of collateral, Perceived lack of feasibility of project and Incompleteness 
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Table 1: Financing Patterns in Developing Countries 
This table presents financing patterns across seven developing countries, geographic regions and country income groups across the world. In Panel A, Retained Earnings, Local Commercial Banks, 
Foreign Owned Commercial Banks, Equity, Operations Finance, Investment Funds, Loans from Family and Friends, Informal (eg: moneylender) and Other are financing proportions that stand for the 
proportion of new investments financed by each of these sources. Operations Finance consists of financing from leasing, trade credit and credit cards. Investment Funds includes funds from investment 
funds, development bank and other state services. In Panel B, we present two sets of aggregate financing patterns. The first set consists of Internal financing (Retained Earnings, Loans from Family and 
Friends and Other sources); Bank Financing (Local commercial banks and Foreign Owned commercial banks); Informal (informal sources such as moneylender or informal bank); Equity Financing, 
Operations Finance and Investment Funds. The second set consists of Bank Financing; and Self Fund Raising (100-Bank Financing) as defined in Allen et al. (2005) to represent the proportion of new 
investments financed by all other sources except Bank Financing.  The financing proportions are in percentages. 
 
























Friends  Equity 
Informal 
Sources  Other 
Bangladesh    892 59.92 28.41  1.22  4.55  0.26  4.27 0.38 0.35 0.64 
Brazil    1351  56.32 13.09  1.21  12.12  8.45  1.21 4.29 1.04 2.27 
China   1342  15.24  20.24 0.12  1.03 0.55  5.89  12.39  1.84  42.70 
India
c    92  43.84 30.73  2.75  0.43  9.52  3.56 4.33 0.75 4.09 
Indonesia   291  41.89  13.21  3.13  5.49  1.67  17.73  1.34  6.74  8.80 
Nigeria    145 63.94 29.76  0.00  1.07  1.55  0.74 2.59 0.34 0.00 
Russian  Federation    701 82.47  5.57  0.36  5.87  0.73  1.74 0.36 1.02 1.87 
Across Regions                                  
Africa  15  2708  66.02 18.14  1.05  6.15  0.98  1.88 1.36 0.48 3.95 
East Asia and Pacific 
(excluding China)  8  5307  31.19  30.77  1.10  3.30  1.37  7.08  21.38  1.23  2.57 
East Europe and Central Asia  36  15489  68.53  11.38  1.48  7.87  1.01  2.94  4.20  0.71  1.88 
Latin America and Caribbean  10  4001  53.96  19.36  1.86  10.79  3.63  2.89  3.13  0.76  3.62 
Middle East and North Africa  5  2103  74.52  12.37  0.69  5.25  0.28  2.46  1.70  0.15  2.57 
South  Asia  5  1572  58.63 21.95  0.86  4.76  1.00  4.59 3.23 0.68 4.29 
Across Income Groups                                  
Low Income  26  6913  59.22  16.32  1.10  3.23  1.30  5.47  10.43  0.94  1.99 
Middle  Income  45 21062  59.26 16.12  1.40  7.29  1.43  3.26 4.89 0.82 5.53 
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Panel B: Aggregate Financing Patterns 






of firms  Internal 
Bank 
Financing  Informal 
Operations 
Finance  Equity 
Investment 
Funds  Bank Financing 
Self Fund 
Raising 
Bangladesh   892  64.84  29.64  0.35  4.55  0.38  0.26  29.64  70.36 
Brazil   1351  59.80  14.30  1.04  12.12  4.29  8.45  14.30  85.70 
China   1342  63.82  20.37  1.84  1.03  12.39  0.55  20.37  79.63 
India   92  51.49  33.48  0.75  0.43  4.33  9.52  33.48  66.52 
Indonesia   291  68.42  16.34  6.74  5.49  1.34  1.67  16.34  83.66 
Nigeria   145  64.69  29.76  0.34  1.07  2.59  1.55  29.76  70.24 
Russian Federation    701  86.08  5.93  1.02  5.87  0.36  0.73  5.93  94.07 
Across Regions                               
Africa 15  2708  71.84  19.19  0.48  6.15  1.36  0.98  19.19  80.81 
East Asia and Pacific 
(excluding  China)  8 5307  40.84  31.87 1.23  3.30  21.38  1.37  31.87  68.13 
East Europe and Central Asia  36  15489  73.34  12.86  0.71  7.87  4.20  1.01  12.86  87.14 
Latin America and Caribbean  10  4001  60.47  21.22  0.76  10.79  3.13  3.63  21.22  78.78 
Middle East and North Africa  5  2103  79.55  13.07  0.15  5.25  1.70  0.28  13.07  86.93 
South  Asia  5 1572  67.51  22.82 0.68  4.76 3.23 1.00  22.82  77.18 
Across Income Groups                               
Low Income  26  6913  66.67  17.42  0.94  3.23  10.43  1.30  17.42  82.58 
Middle Income  45  21062  68.05  17.52  0.82  7.29  4.89  1.43  17.52  82.48 
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Table 2: Financing Patterns in China 
This table presents financing patterns across different cities and regions in China and across different types of firms. In Panel A, Retained Earnings, Local Commercial Banks, Foreign Owned 
Commercial Banks, Equity, Operations Finance, Investment Funds, Loans from Family and Friends, Informal (eg: moneylender) and Other are financing proportions that stand for the proportion of new 
investments financed by each of these sources. Operations Finance consists of financing from leasing, trade credit and credit cards. Investment Funds includes funds from investment funds, development 
bank and other state services. In Panel B, we present two sets of aggregate financing patterns. The first set consists of Internal financing (Retained Earnings, Loans from Family and Friends and Other 
sources); Bank Financing (Local commercial banks and Foreign Owned commercial banks); Informal (informal sources such as moneylender or informal bank); Equity Financing, Operations Finance 
and Investment Funds. The second set consists of Bank Financing and Self Fund Raising (100-Bank Financing) as defined in Allen et al. (2005) to represent the proportion of new investments financed 
by all other sources except Bank Financing. The financing proportions are in percentages. 
Panel A: Individual Financing Patterns 





















Across Cities in China                                     
Benxi Northeast  Liaoning  89  7.96  33.81  0.00  0.00  9.56  5.43  14.03  1.12  28.09 
Changchun Northeast  Jilin  104  26.85  13.71 0.00 0.19 1.92  0.96 10.74  0.10 45.53 
Changsha Central  Hunan  55  15.56  29.91 0.36 0.00 4.84  4.55  6.96  0.64  37.18 
Chongqing Southwest  Chongqing  95  17.63  29.99  0.00  3.29  1.94  2.47  8.26  0.00  36.41 
Dalian Northeast  Liaoning  51  1.00  16.12  0.00  3.92  1.67  0.02  13.73  1.96  61.59 
Guiyang Southwest  Guizhou  57  8.93  30.12  0.00  0.09  0.61  0.00  9.54  0.32  50.39 
Haerbin Northeast  Heilongjiang  52  7.88  3.98  0.00  0.58  2.88  0.00  12.88  1.92  69.87 
Hangzhou Coastal  Zhejiang  78  24.96  25.53  0.19  1.03  1.41  0.00  22.91  0.00  23.97 
Jiangmen Coastal  Guangdong  70  4.29  35.13  1.57  2.26  5.13  1.14  8.31  1.86  40.31 
Kunming Southwest  Yunan  58  19.57  27.74 0.00 1.72 9.83  1.72  17.45  0.00  21.97 
Lanzhou Northwest  Gansu  27  11.85  15.11  0.00  0.00  11.48  1.48  16.67  0.00  43.41 
Nanchang Central  Jiangxi  135  18.01  15.39 0.00 0.89 8.22  1.07  10.64  0.19  45.59 
Nanning Southwest  Guangxi  48  15.23  9.92 0.00  0.83  11.15  4.85  28.23  0.00  29.79 
Shenzhen Coastal  Guangdong  78  12.49  9.59  0.00  1.92  0.00  0.00  5.71  0.00  70.29 
Wenzhou Coastal  Zhejiang  39  21.15  24.31  0.00  0.00  11.03  0.26  39.87  0.00  3.38 
Wuhan Central  Hubei  85  15.74  26.01  0.00  0.00  5.94  5.65  4.65  0.00  42.01 
Xian Northwest  Shaanxi  62  13.60  13.73  0.00  1.61  4.03  1.90  9.13  1.15  54.85 
Zhengzhou Central  Henan  104  16.08  9.20 0.00  0.10  9.69  0.96  8.83  0.05  55.10 
Across Regions in China  
Central     379  16.61  18.18  0.05  0.34  7.62  2.57  8.26  0.17  46.18 
Coastal     265  15.27  23.19  0.47  1.46  3.39  0.34  16.49  0.49  38.89 
Northeast    296  13.38  18.46  0.00  0.84  4.34  1.97  12.62  1.05  47.33 
Northwest     89  13.07  14.15  0.00  1.12  6.29  1.78  11.42  0.80  51.38 
Southwest     258  15.70  25.78  0.00  1.78  5.13  2.20  14.33  0.07  35.02 
                                        58





















Across All Firms     1287  15.16  20.52  0.11  1.03  5.41  1.85  12.39  0.46  43.07 
Across Firm Sizes                                     
Micro     250  11.41  15.06  0.00  0.48  13.54  2.58  12.78  0.84  43.31 
Small     249  14.20  14.82  0.04  1.14  6.70  1.59  13.97  0.10  47.45 
Medium     249  16.50  21.89  0.46  0.60  4.62  1.49  11.14  0.94  42.36 
Large     249  17.04  21.35  0.00  1.10  2.79  1.99  12.14  0.14  43.45 
Very Large      249  17.02  30.13  0.08  1.61  0.08  1.81  11.25  0.29  37.73 
Legal Status                                     
Publicly Listed Company    37 9.00 33.32 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  36.11  0.00  21.57 
Privately held Company      490  18.11  20.54  0.03  0.98  10.00  2.21  14.14  0.26  33.75 
Cooperatives     165  15.92  17.59  0.00  0.55  5.33  0.99  10.65  0.06  48.92 
Across Firm Ownership (>50%)                                  
State     288  11.69  25.90  0.00  0.02  0.79  1.47  6.36  0.59  53.18 
Domestic Private      901  16.23  19.60  0.14  1.10  7.30  2.00  14.16  0.36  39.12 
Foreign Private      108  16.19  14.56  0.19  3.36  1.67  1.39  13.64  0.93  48.08 
Age                                     
Less than 5 years      262  14.83  20.53  0.00  0.73  10.29  2.61  16.33  0.52  34.18 
Between 5 and 20 years      735  16.67  18.16  0.20  1.45  4.85  1.52  13.53  0.62  43.01 
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Panel B: Aggregate Financing Patterns 
 
            Aggregate Financing Patterns  Allen et al. (2005)'s Categorization 
 Region  Province 
Number of 
firms  Internal 
Bank 
Financing  Informal 
Operations 
Finance  Equity 
Investment 
Funds  Bank Financing  Self Fund Raising 
Across Cities in China                                  
Benxi Northeast  Liaoning  89  45.61  33.81  5.43  0.00  14.03  1.12  33.81  66.19 
Changchun Northeast  Jilin  104  74.30 13.71  0.96  0.19  10.74 0.10  13.71  86.29 
Changsha Central  Hunan  55  57.58  30.27 4.55  0.00  6.96  0.64  30.27  69.73 
Chongqing Southwest  Chongqing  95  55.98  29.99  2.47  3.29  8.26  0.00  29.99 70.01 
Dalian Northeast  Liaoning  51  64.25  16.12  0.02  3.92  13.73  1.96  16.12  83.88 
Guiyang Southwest  Guizhou  57  59.93  30.12  0.00  0.09  9.54  0.32  30.12  69.88 
Haerbin Northeast  Heilongjiang  52  80.63  3.98  0.00  0.58  12.88  1.92  3.98  96.02 
Hangzhou Coastal  Zhejiang  78  50.35  25.72  0.00  1.03  22.91  0.00  25.72  74.28 
Jiangmen Coastal  Guangdong  70  49.73  36.70  1.14  2.26  8.31  1.86  36.70  63.30 
Kunming Southwest  Yunan  58  51.36  27.74 1.72  1.72  17.45  0.00  27.74  72.26 
Lanzhou Northwest  Gansu  27  66.74  15.11  1.48  0.00  16.67  0.00  15.11  84.89 
Nanchang Central  Jiangxi  135  71.82  15.39 1.07  0.89  10.64  0.19  15.39  84.61 
Nanning Southwest  Guangxi  48  56.17  9.92 4.85  0.83 28.23 0.00  9.92  90.08 
Shenzhen Coastal  Guangdong  78  82.78  9.59  0.00  1.92  5.71  0.00  9.59  90.41 
Wenzhou Coastal  Zhejiang  39  35.56  24.31  0.26  0.00  39.87  0.00  24.31  75.69 
Wuhan Central  Hubei  85  63.69  26.01  5.65  0.00  4.65  0.00  26.01  73.99 
Xian Northwest  Shaanxi  62  72.48  13.73  1.90  1.61  9.13  1.15  13.73  86.27 
Zhengzhou Central  Henan  104  80.87  9.20 0.96  0.10  8.83 0.05  9.20  90.80 
Across Regions in China  
Central     379  70.41  18.23  2.57  0.34  8.26  0.17  18.23  81.77 
Coastal     265  57.55  23.66  0.34  1.46  16.49  0.49  23.66  76.34 
Northeast     296  65.05  18.46  1.97  0.84  12.62  1.05  18.46  81.54 
Northwest     89  70.74  14.15  1.78  1.12  11.42  0.80  14.15  85.85 
Southwest     258  55.85  25.78  2.20  1.78  14.33  0.07  25.78  74.22 
                  
Across All Firms     1287  63.64  20.63  1.85  1.03  12.39  0.46 20.63  79.37 
Across Firm Sizes                                  
Micro     250  68.27  15.06  2.58  0.48  12.78  0.84  15.06  84.94 
Small     249  68.35  14.86  1.59  1.14  13.97  0.10  14.86  85.14 
Medium    249  63.47  22.35  1.49  0.60  11.14  0.94  22.35  77.65 
Large     249  63.27  21.35  1.99  1.10  12.14  0.14  21.35  78.65 
Very Large      249  54.84  30.21  1.81  1.61  11.25  0.29  30.21  69.79 
Legal Status                                  
Publicly Listed Company    37 30.57  33.32  0.00 0.00 36.11 0.00  33.32  66.68 
Privately held Company      490  61.86  20.57  2.21  0.98  14.14  0.26  20.57  79.43 
Cooperatives     165  70.16  17.59  0.99  0.55  10.65  0.06  17.59  82.41   60
            Aggregate Financing Patterns  Allen et al. (2005)'s Categorization 








Funds Bank  Financing  Self Fund Raising 
Across Firm Ownership (>50%)                               
State     288  65.66  25.90  1.47  0.02  6.36  0.59  25.90  74.10 
Domestic Private      901  62.65  19.74  2.00  1.10  14.16  0.36  19.74  80.26 
Foreign Private      108  65.94  14.75  1.39  3.36  13.64  0.93  14.75  85.25 
Age                                  
Less than 5 years      262  59.29  20.53  2.61  0.73  6.36  0.59  20.53  79.47 
Between 5 and 20 years      735  64.53  18.35  1.52  1.45  14.16  0.36  18.35  81.65 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A presents summary statistics. Panel B presents the correlations between the financing variables and firm performance. Bank 
Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm said it had no bank loan and 
had no overdraft facility or line of credit. Access Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had access to a bank 
loan in any year prior from 1990-2001 and 0 otherwise. Bank Financing Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a 
bank or financial institution AND (bank financing of new investments was greater than 50% OR bank financing of working capital 
was greater than 50%).Bank Financing takes the value 0 if (the firm said it had no loan from a bank or financial institution OR said it 
had no overdraft facility or line of credit) AND (bank financing of new investments was equal to 0% AND bank financing of working 
capital was equal to 0%). Self Financing1 takes the value 1 if the sum of informal financing and other financing of new investments 
was greater than 50% OR the sum of informal financing and other financing of working capital was greater than 50%. Self Financing1 
takes the value 0 if the sum of informal and other financing of new investments is equal to 0 % AND the sum of informal and other 
financing of working capital is equal to 0%. Self Financing2 takes the value 1 if the sum of internal, informal, family, and other 
financing of new investments was greater than 50% OR the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of working capital 
was greater than 50%. Self Financing2 takes the value 0 if the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of new 
investments is equal to 0 % AND the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of working capital is equal to 0%.Sales 
Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002 and from 1999 to 2002. Labor Productivity 
Growth is defined as the log change in labor productivity where labor productivity is (Sales-Total Material Costs)/Total Number of 
Workers. Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002 and from 1999 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is the share of net profits 
re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Firm Size Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Age is the age of the company in 
2003. Corporation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 otherwise. 
Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a Collective. State Ownership Dummy 
takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the company. Competition takes values 1 to 5 for 1-3 competitors, 4- 6 
competitors. 7- 15 competitors, 16-100 competitors and over 100 competitors respectively for the number of competitors in its main 
business line in the domestic Market.  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N  Mean  Standard  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Financing 
Bank Dummy  2326  0.2309  0.4215  0  1 
Access Dummy  2400  0.2858  0.4519  0  1 
Bank Financing  941  0.2721  0.4452  0  1 
Self Financing1  1446  0.6023  0.4896  0  1 
Self Financing2  1502  0.8302  0.3756  0  1 
Firm Performance 
Sales Growth [2001-2002]  2370  0.0563  0.7072  -7.44  7.13 
Reinvestment Rate [2001]  2115  0.1761  0.3230  0  1 
Sales Growth [1999-2002]  2559  0.1349  0.3890  -2.36  2.71 
Labor Productivity Growth [2001-2002]  1558  0.0045  0.8132  -6.68  8.02 
Labor Productivity Growth [1999-2002]  1486  0.0810  0.3397  -1.97  3.28 
Growth in TFP [2001-2002]  693  -0.0192  0.9521  -4.84  6.31 
Firm Characteristics         
Size Dummies  2283  2.9991  1.4145  1  5 
Age   2400  15.9862  14.3902  3  53 
Corporation Dummy  2400  0.4046  0.4909  0  1 
Cooperatives Dummy  2400  0.1612  0.3678  0  1 
State Ownership Dummy  2399  0.2213  0.4152  0  1 
Competition Dummies  2326  3.8224  1.3535  1  5   62
 
 
Panel B: Correlations between Financing and Firm Performance 
Sales Growth  Sales Growth 






































 a         
Bank Dummy  0.037
 c 0.132
 a 0.0058  0.0671
 a 0.0573
 b       
Access Dummy  0.0003  -0.0076  -0.0332  -0.0613
 a -0.0601
 b 0.0914
 a     
Bank Financing  0.0366  0.1664




 a    
Self Financing1  -0.0077  -0.0923
 a 0.0639
 b -0.0491
 b 0.0016  -0.1174
 a -0.0854
 a -0.1762
 a  
Self Financing2  0.0009  -0.0672
 a 0.0746





c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
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Table 4: Bank Financing and Firm Performance – Partial Correlations 
The estimated model is: Sales Growth/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α + β1BankDummy+ β2Small +  β3 Medium +  β4Large +  β5Very Large + β6 Mid-Age + β7 Old + β8Corporations + 
β9Collectives + β10State Ownership + β11Competition Dummies + β12City Dummies.  
Sales Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002 and from 1999 to 2002. Labor Productivity Growth is defined as the log change in productivity where 
productivity is (Sales-Total Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Labor Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002 and from 1999 to 2002. Growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is 
computed from 2001-2002 where TFP is calculated as the residual from a regression of value added on labor and fixed assets, allowing for industry-specific coefficients for each variable. Reinvestment 
Rate is the share of net profits re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Bank Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm said it had no 
bank loan and had no overdraft facility or line of credit. Firm Size Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Small, Medium, Large and Very Large dummies take the value 1 if the firm is in the 
second, third, fourth or fifth quintile respectively of firm sales. Mid-Age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is between 5 and 20 years of age and Old is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the firm is greater than 20 years old. The omitted age dummy is less than 5 years. Corporation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 
otherwise. Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a Collective. State Ownership Dummy takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the 
company. 4 to 6 Competitors, 7 to 15 Competitors, 16 to 100 Competitors and Over 100 Competitors are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has the corresponding number of competitors 
in its main business line in the domestic market. The omitted category is 1 to 3 Competitors. Columns 1 to 5 present results for the full sample and columns 6 to 10 present results for a sample of firms 
that don’t include firms registered as publicly traded firms and state owned enterprises. We use OLS regressions with robust standard errors. 
 
   Full Sample  Drop Public Corporations and State Owned Companies 



















































Bank Dummy  0.075
b 0.078




a -0.004  0.051  0.120
a 0.066
b 
  [0.034]  [0.020]  [0.051] [0.084]  [0.019] [0.022] [0.040] [0.024]  [0.057] [0.098]  [0.024] [0.026] 
Small -0.121
b 0.057




a -0.09  -0.061  -0.205
a -0.097
b 
  [0.057]  [0.023]  [0.079] [0.253]  [0.031] [0.038] [0.064] [0.026]  [0.084] [0.258]  [0.034] [0.043] 
Medium -0.136
b 0.071




a -0.007  -0.186  -0.289
a -0.168
a 
  [0.056]  [0.024]  [0.080] [0.239]  [0.031] [0.038] [0.065] [0.028]  [0.088] [0.247]  [0.035] [0.043] 
Large -0.160
a 0.047




b -0.123  -0.347  -0.319
a -0.202
a 
  [0.057]  [0.023]  [0.081] [0.247]  [0.032] [0.040] [0.066] [0.027]  [0.089] [0.252]  [0.037] [0.046] 
Very Large  -0.230
a 0.075





a -0.086  -0.343  -0.398
a -0.220
a 
  [0.072]  [0.026]  [0.087] [0.250]  [0.036] [0.043] [0.094] [0.034]  [0.101] [0.257]  [0.044] [0.053] 
Mid-Age 0.001  -0.007  -0.038  -0.113  -0.143
a -0.090
a -0.006  -0.027  -0.04  -0.175  -0.163
a -0.098
a 
  [0.041]  [0.021]  [0.059] [0.104]  [0.024] [0.029] [0.047] [0.024]  [0.063] [0.118]  [0.026] [0.032] 
Old -0.064  -0.048
b 0.03  -0.091  -0.208
a -0.046 -0.035 -0.086
a 0.064  -0.086  -0.210
a -0.06 
  [0.049]  [0.024]  [0.075] [0.146]  [0.027] [0.035] [0.064] [0.032]  [0.083] [0.195]  [0.035] [0.040] 
Corporations -0.03  0.083
a -0.027  -0.097  -0.012  -0.038
c -0.066  0.106
a -0.047  -0.096  -0.043
b -0.041 
  [0.035]  [0.019]  [0.057] [0.086]  [0.018] [0.022] [0.043] [0.022]  [0.069] [0.099]  [0.021] [0.026] 
Cooperative -0.116




b -0.05  0.006  -0.184
a -0.098
a 
  [0.053]  [0.022]  [0.068] [0.128]  [0.025] [0.027] [0.065] [0.028]  [0.081] [0.140]  [0.030] [0.032] 
State -0.01  -0.022  0.053  -0.024  -0.037
c -0.033 -0.002  -0.02  -0.019 0.149 0.01  -0.019   64
   Full Sample  Drop Public Corporations and State Owned Companies 



















































  [0.041]  [0.019]  [0.062] [0.162]  [0.020] [0.026] [0.076] [0.035]  [0.115] [0.296]  [0.039] [0.046] 
4-6 Competitors  0.012  0.053  -0.049 -0.181  0.011 -0.029 -0.017  0.092
b -0.004  -0.116  0.021  -0.02 
  [0.055]  [0.033]  [0.086] [0.157]  [0.033] [0.038] [0.070] [0.039]  [0.104] [0.191]  [0.043] [0.047] 
7-15 Competitors  0.015  0.004  0.011 0.055  -0.031 -0.03 0.019 0.033  0.075  0.003  -0.007  0 
  [0.062]  [0.029]  [0.097] [0.169]  [0.034] [0.042] [0.080] [0.035]  [0.126] [0.199]  [0.043] [0.053] 
16-100 
Competitors -0.053  0.022 -0.043  -0.053  -0.063
b -0.077
b -0.051  0.063
c -0.023  -0.032  -0.06  -0.074
c 
  [0.049]  [0.027]  [0.078] [0.157]  [0.029] [0.036] [0.063] [0.032]  [0.096] [0.198]  [0.038] [0.045] 
>100 Competitors  -0.125
b 0.02  -0.073  -0.052  -0.091
a -0.081
b -0.107
c 0.046  -0.029  0.012  -0.083
b -0.073
c 
  [0.050]  [0.025]  [0.075] [0.141]  [0.027] [0.034] [0.061] [0.029]  [0.091] [0.174]  [0.036] [0.043] 
Changchun   -0.024  0.178
a -0.03  0.392
b 0.149
a 0.059 -0.05  0.186
a -0.003  0.257  0.159
b 0.135
b 
  [0.091]  [0.039]  [0.144] [0.183]  [0.049] [0.053] [0.125] [0.052]  [0.155] [0.210]  [0.064] [0.064] 
Changsha   -0.024  0.083
b  -0.083 0.107  0.048 -0.034  -0.079 0.095
b -0.213  -0.007  0.07  0.017 
  [0.089]  [0.032]  [0.130] [0.199]  [0.044] [0.046] [0.121] [0.045]  [0.153] [0.227]  [0.055] [0.056] 
Chongqing   0.034  0.089
b 0.12  0.176  0.093
b 0.077
c -0.022  0.055  0.001  0.172  0.121
b 0.099
c 
  [0.086]  [0.038]  [0.125] [0.206]  [0.044] [0.046] [0.118] [0.048]  [0.139] [0.250]  [0.057] [0.056] 
Dalian    -0.108 0.031  0.023 0.463  0.043 0.035  -0.127 0.032  -0.13 0.38  0.088 0.074 
  [0.124]  [0.038]  [0.130] [0.299]  [0.058] [0.054] [0.123] [0.052]  [0.144] [0.344]  [0.069] [0.066] 
Guiyang   0.031  0.064
c  -0.049 0.244  0.069 -0.008 0.111  0.089
c -0.191  0.407  0.155
b 0.027 
  [0.108]  [0.037]  [0.129] [0.536]  [0.054] [0.053] [0.155] [0.054]  [0.160] [0.647]  [0.073] [0.062] 
Haerbin -0.146  0.081
b -0.156  -0.136  0.054  -0.039  -0.122  0.094
c -0.203  -0.197  0.077  0.013 
  [0.096]  [0.038]  [0.135] [0.260]  [0.055] [0.055] [0.124] [0.048]  [0.153] [0.298]  [0.066] [0.066] 
Hangzhou   0.06  0.118
a -0.034  0.380
b 0.147
a 0.052 0.035 0.130
b -0.071  0.206  0.184
a 0.150
b 
  [0.105]  [0.044]  [0.164] [0.193]  [0.051] [0.059] [0.133] [0.056]  [0.156] [0.223]  [0.062] [0.063] 
Jiangmen 0.061  0.094
b -0.031  0.336
c 0.045  -0.042  0.002  0.087
c -0.119  0.192  0.048  0.014 
  [0.106]  [0.040]  [0.145] [0.195]  [0.048] [0.056] [0.140] [0.048]  [0.161] [0.225]  [0.060] [0.065] 
Kunming   0.003  0.112
a 0.047  0.17  0.005  -0.022  -0.078  0.124
b -0.087  -0.001  0.006  0.017 
  [0.099]  [0.036]  [0.121] [0.231]  [0.048] [0.048] [0.135] [0.048]  [0.144] [0.270]  [0.063] [0.060] 
Lanzhou   0.011  0.089
a  -0.092 0.415  0.003 -0.065  -0.059 0.078
c -0.181  0.185  -0.013  -0.046 
  [0.101]  [0.035]  [0.147] [0.309]  [0.050] [0.054] [0.130] [0.047]  [0.175] [0.430]  [0.066] [0.073] 
Nanchang   0.114  0.191
a -0.08  0.014  0.113
b 0.042 0.069  0.227
a -0.184  -0.192  0.136
b 0.087 
  [0.091]  [0.038]  [0.143] [0.239]  [0.047] [0.056] [0.128] [0.053]  [0.173] [0.286]  [0.064] [0.074]   65
   Full Sample  Drop Public Corporations and State Owned Companies 



















































Nanning   -0.113  0.076
b -0.161  -0.131  0.025  -0.086  -0.147  0.086
c -0.330
c -0.103  0.074  -0.037 
  [0.116]  [0.036]  [0.144] [0.193]  [0.056] [0.054] [0.158] [0.051]  [0.170] [0.206]  [0.074] [0.067] 
Shenzhen 0.223
c 0.048  0.151  -0.009  0.185
a 0.116 0.215  0.05  0.033 -0.179  0.235
a 0.173 
  [0.131]  [0.042]  [0.236] [0.302]  [0.057] [0.084] [0.183] [0.057]  [0.295] [0.370]  [0.077] [0.115] 
Wenzhou   0.108  0.123
a -0.107  0.208  0.155
a 0.031 0.068 0.101
b -0.186  0.162  0.192
a 0.073 
  [0.104]  [0.046]  [0.156] [0.241]  [0.052] [0.058] [0.131] [0.051]  [0.170] [0.261]  [0.063] [0.064] 
Wuhan   -0.181
c 0.081
b  -0.182 0.054  0.027 -0.001  -0.261
c 0.059  -0.318
c 0.025  0.026  0.028 
  [0.097]  [0.033]  [0.137] [0.208]  [0.045] [0.051] [0.134] [0.045]  [0.163] [0.224]  [0.059] [0.066] 
Xian -0.008  0.085
b -0.044  0.082  0.067  0.035  -0.06  0.102
b -0.236  0.018  0.099  0.086 
  [0.108]  [0.033]  [0.155] [0.209]  [0.050] [0.047] [0.147] [0.046]  [0.183] [0.242]  [0.064] [0.060] 
Zhengzhou   -0.011  0.144
a 0.037  0.264  0.027  -0.045  -0.061  0.125
a -0.077  0.223  0.02  -0.025 
  [0.085]  [0.039]  [0.118] [0.189]  [0.046] [0.051] [0.116] [0.048]  [0.137] [0.222]  [0.059] [0.061] 
Constant 0.288
a -0.022  0.151 0.231  0.489
a 0.349
a 0.360
a -0.071  0.246 0.283  0.519
a 0.319
a 
  [0.099]  [0.036]  [0.144] [0.281]  [0.052] [0.061] [0.136] [0.048]  [0.166] [0.301]  [0.067] [0.074] 
Observations 2145  1905  1456  643  2135  1423  1534  1363  1099  519  1527  1072 
R-squared  0.036  0.072  0.017 0.054  0.175 0.071 0.037 0.087  0.023 0.049  0.195 0.083 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
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Table 5: Bank Financing and Firm Performance – Selection Model 
A two-step selection model is used to estimate the effect of the endogenous Bank Dummy (binary treatment) on Firm Performance.  
In Panel A: The first step is: Bank Dummy = α0 + β1 Collateral + β2Small +  β3 Medium +  β4Large +  β5Very Large + β6 Mid-Age + β7 Old + β8Corporations + β9Collectives + β10State Ownership + 
β11Competition Dummies + β12City Dummies. The second step is: Sales/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α1 + γ1BankDummy+ γ2Small +  γ3 Medium +  γ4Large +  γ5Very Large + γ6 Mid-Age 
+ γ7 Old + γ8Corporations + γ9Collectives + γ10State Ownership + γ11Competition Dummies + γ12City Dummies.  
Sales Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002. Labor Productivity Growth is defined as the log change in productivity where productivity is (Sales-Total 
Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Labor Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is the share of net profits re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Bank 
Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm said it had no bank loan and had no overdraft facility or line of credit. The identifying variable 
is Collateral which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the financing required a collateral or a deposit and 0 if the financing did not require collateral or if the firm did not apply for a loan 
because of stringent collateral requirements or if the firm was rejected for a loan because of the lack of collateral. Firm Size Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Small, Medium, Large and 
Very Large dummies take the value 1 if the firm is in the second, third, fourth or fifth quintile respectively of firm sales. Mid-age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is between 5 and 
20 years of age and Old is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is greater than 20 years old. The omitted age dummy is less than 5 years. Corporation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm 
is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 otherwise. Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a Collective. State Ownership Dummy 
takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the company. 4 to 6 Competitors, 7 to 15 Competitors, 16 to 100 Competitors and Over 100 Competitors are dummy variables that take the value 1 if 
the firm has the corresponding number of competitors in its main business line in the domestic market. The omitted category is 1 to 3 Competitors. Columns 1 to 6 present results for the full sample and 
columns 7 to 12 present results for a sample of firms that don’t include firms registered as publicly traded firms and state owned enterprises. Hazard Lambdas are reported for each of the second stages. 
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Bank Dummy  0.310
a   0.183
a  0.116      0.244
b   0.156
b  0.068  
  [0.116]    [0.058]   [0.147]     [0.124]    [0.063]   [0.143]  







    [0.076]    [0.080]  [0.089]    [0.095]    [0.099]  [0.107] 
Small -0.229
a 0.101  0.075
b 0.081  -0.101  -0.044  -0.219
a 0.01  0.093
a -0.018  -0.129  -0.131 




b 0.224  -0.062  0.101  -0.276
a 0.139  0.082
b 0.142 -0.11  0.01 





c 0.215  -0.284
a 0.281
c 0.06 0.262  -0.190
b 0.085 
  [0.065]  [0.140] [0.032] [0.146]  [0.086]  [0.168]  [0.073]  [0.161] [0.037] [0.167]  [0.088]  [0.186] 










  [0.076]  [0.144] [0.038] [0.150]  [0.099]  [0.173]  [0.089]  [0.173] [0.045] [0.181]  [0.105]  [0.200] 
Mid  Age  -0.001  -0.042 -0.007  -0.06 -0.097 -0.15  -0.022  -0.051 -0.014 -0.059  -0.1  -0.129 
  [0.049]  [0.104] [0.024] [0.108]  [0.065]  [0.123]  [0.054]  [0.117] [0.027] [0.122]  [0.066]  [0.137] 
Old -0.033  -0.02  -0.061
b -0.075 -0.052 -0.177  -0.018  -0.184 -0.105
a -0.173 0.024 -0.314 
  [0.061]  [0.129] [0.030] [0.135]  [0.080]  [0.154]  [0.077]  [0.169] [0.039] [0.174]  [0.092]  [0.194] 
Corporations -0.036  0.170
c 0.070
a 0.139 -0.06 0.147  -0.065  -0.026 0.111
a -0.023  -0.084  -0.064 
  [0.044]  [0.089] [0.022] [0.094]  [0.055]  [0.102]  [0.050]  [0.108] [0.025] [0.113]  [0.060]  [0.123]   67
    1  2 3 4  5  6  7  8 9  10  11  12 








































a -0.02  0.024  0.003  -0.01  0.05 -0.207
a -0.063  0.061
c -0.046  -0.044  -0.052 
  [0.056]  [0.124] [0.028] [0.130]  [0.072]  [0.144]  [0.066]  [0.148] [0.034] [0.154]  [0.079]  [0.166] 
State -0.032  0.062  -0.01  0.102  0.066  0.097             
 [0.049]  [0.102]  [0.025]  [0.108]  [0.067]  [0.126]             







  [0.080]  [0.161] [0.040] [0.170]  [0.099]  [0.182]  [0.095]  [0.200] [0.048] [0.207]  [0.109]  [0.220] 
7 to 15 
Competitors -0.011  0.203  -0.004  0.236  -0.097 0.245  -0.034  0.276  0.014 0.317  -0.072  0.392
c 
  [0.074]  [0.155] [0.037] [0.163]  [0.092]  [0.175]  [0.090]  [0.198] [0.045] [0.204]  [0.104]  [0.217] 
16 to 100 
Competitors -0.055  0.232  0.003  0.269
c -0.1 0.201  -0.059  0.291 0.041 0.249  -0.122  0.297 
  [0.068]  [0.145] [0.034] [0.153]  [0.085]  [0.164]  [0.082]  [0.185] [0.041] [0.190]  [0.093]  [0.201] 
Over 100 
Competitors  -0.146
b 0.141  0.007  0.155  -0.153
c 0.173  -0.134
c  0.237 0.02 0.231  -0.143  0.308 
  [0.064]  [0.140] [0.032] [0.147]  [0.083]  [0.161]  [0.078]  [0.177] [0.039] [0.183]  [0.091]  [0.197] 
Hazard Lambda   -0.146
b         -0.068
c      -0.095   -0.122       -0.042      -0.059 
   [0.072]       [0.036]      [0.092]   [0.078]       [0.039]      [0.090] 
Observations  1549  1549 1397 1397  1089  1089  1110  1110 1004 1004 819  819 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
a significant at 1% 
   68
Table 6: Bank Financing and Firm Performance – Selection Model Robustness 
In Panels A and B, a two-step selection effects model is used to estimate the effect of the endogenous Bank Dummy (binary treatment) on Firm Performance. In Panel C, average treatment effects on the 
treated are reported using Propensity Score Matching. 
In Panel A: The first step is: Bank Dummy = α0 + β1 Collateral + β2Small +  β3 Medium +  β4Large +  β5Very Large + β6 Middle-Age + β7 Old + β8Corporations + β9Collectives + β10State Ownership + 
β11Competition Dummies + β12City Dummies + β13 Bank Corruption + β14 Government Help dummy + β15Loan from Group or Holding Company + β16Loan Guarantee Program + β17 Located in Export 
Processing Zone+ β18 Property Rights + β19Dispute Resolution in Courts + β20CEO Education Level + β21Politically Connected CEO. The second step is: Sales/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = 
α1 + γ1BankDummy+ γ2Small +  γ3 Medium +  γ4Large +  γ5Very Large + γ6 Middle-Age + γ7 Old + γ8Corporations + γ9Collectives + γ10State Ownership + γ11Competition Dummies + γ12City Dummies + 
γ13 Bank Corruption + γ14 Government Help dummy + γ15Loan from Group or Holding Company + γ16Loan Guarantee Program +γ17 Located in Export Processing Zone+ γ18 Property Rights + γ19Dispute 
Resolution in Courts + γ20CEO Education Level + γ21Politically Connected CEO. 
In Panel B: The first step is: Access Dummy = α0 + β1 Collateral + β2Small +  β3 Medium +  β4Large +  β5Very Large + β6 Middle-Age + β7 Old + β8Corporations + β9Collectives + β10State Ownership + 
β11Competition Dummies + β12City Dummies. The second step is: Sales/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α1 + γ1Access Dummy+ γ2Small +  γ3 Medium +  γ4Large +  γ5Very Large + γ6 
Middle-Age + γ7 Old + γ8Corporations + γ9Collectives + γ10State Ownership + γ11Competition Dummies + γ12City Dummies.  
Sales Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002. Labor Productivity Growth is defined as the log change in productivity where labor productivity is (Sales-
Total Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Labor Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is the share of net profits re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Bank 
Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm said it had no bank loan and had no overdraft facility or line of credit. Access Dummy is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm had access to a bank loan in any year prior from 1990-2001 and 0 otherwise. The identifying variable is Collateral which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the financing required a collateral or a deposit and 0 if the financing did not require collateral or if the firm did not apply for a loan because of stringent collateral requirements or if the firm 
was rejected for a loan because of the lack of collateral. Firm Size Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Small, Medium, Large and Very Large dummies take the value 1 if the firm is in the 
second, third, fourth or fifth quintile respectively of firm sales. Middle-age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is between 5 and 20 years of age and Old is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the firm is greater than 20 years old. Corporation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 otherwise. Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy 
takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a Collective. State Ownership Dummy takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the company. 4 to 6 Competitors, 7 to 15 
Competitors, 16 to 100 Competitors and Over 100 Competitors are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has the corresponding number of competitors in its main business line in the 
domestic market. The omitted category is 1 to 3 Competitors. Bank Corruption is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm reported that a gift or informal payment was expected in its dealing 
with bank officials and loan officers and 0 otherwise. Government Help dummy takes the value 1 if a government agency or official assisted the firm in obtaining bank financing. Loan from Group or 
Holding Company takes the value 1 if the firm was a member of a group or a holding company that provided loan to the firm and 0 otherwise. Loan Guarantee Program takes the value 1 if the firm 
benefited from a loan guarantee program offered by loan guarantee companies. Located in Export Processing Zone takes the value 1 if the firm is located in an industrial park, science park or export 
processing zone and 0 otherwise. Property Rights Protection is the likelihood that the legal system will uphold the firm’s contract and property rights in business disputes. CEO Education Level takes the 
values 1 to 4, 1 if the CEO had no education, 2 if the CEO had high-school, secondary school or primary school education, 3 if the CEO had an undergraduate education at home or abroad and 4 if the 
CEO had postgraduate education at home or abroad. Politically Connected CEO takes the value 1 if the CEO was a party secretary, deputy party secretary, party committee member or executive member 
or a party member and 0 if the CEO is not a party member. Columns 1 to 6 present results for the full sample and columns 7 to 12 present. Hazard Lambdas are reported for each of the second stages. 
 
Panel A: Expanded Selection Model 





















Bank Dummy  0.278
c  0.328
b  0.242
a   0.073    
  [0.145]  [0.144]  [0.075]  [0.191]    





   [0.088]  [0.089]  [0.092]  [0.104] 
Sales Growth [1999-2001]    -0.278
a 0.368
a          
     [0.045]  [0.098]           
Bank  Corruption  -0.058 -0.199 -0.066 -0.182 0.017 -0.204  0.087  -0.07   69





















  [0.066] [0.144] [0.065] [0.145] [0.034] [0.150] [0.082] [0.163] 





  [0.054] [0.100] [0.053] [0.101] [0.027] [0.104] [0.068] [0.114] 
Loan from Group/Holding Co.  0.013  0.272




  [0.076] [0.147] [0.075] [0.148] [0.039] [0.157] [0.099] [0.175] 
Loan  Guarantee  Program  -0.024 0.127 -0.019 0.112 -0.013 0.105  0.017  0.059 
  [0.054] [0.111] [0.053] [0.112] [0.027] [0.116] [0.067] [0.129] 





  [0.048] [0.100] [0.048] [0.101] [0.025] [0.104] [0.061] [0.114] 
Property Rights Protection  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0.002 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
CEO Education Level  0.012  0.047  0.036  0.017  -0.005  0.065  -0.054  0.04 
  [0.036] [0.077] [0.036] [0.078] [0.019] [0.082] [0.048] [0.093] 
Politically Connected CEO  -0.051  0.1 -0.046  0.099  0.029 0.086 0.016 0.098 
  [0.045] [0.100] [0.045] [0.101] [0.023] [0.104] [0.058] [0.115] 
Small -0.187
a 0.148 -0.294
a  0.293 0.056 0.109 -0.105 0.047 




b 0.044 0.229 -0.027 0.212 






b -0.071 0.338 
  [0.076] [0.169] [0.081] [0.184] [0.038] [0.173] [0.101] [0.206] 







  [0.087] [0.176] [0.095] [0.193] [0.045] [0.180] [0.116] [0.216] 
Medium 0.014  -0.053  -0.036  0.021  0.004  -0.047  -0.146
b -0.134 
  [0.053] [0.117] [0.053] [0.120] [0.027] [0.121] [0.069] [0.139] 
Old  -0.001 0.062 -0.067 0.145  -0.059
c 0.055  -0.119 -0.001 
  [0.068] [0.148] [0.069] [0.151] [0.035] [0.154] [0.089] [0.178] 
Corporations  -0.031 0.146 -0.027 0.144 0.062
b 0.123 -0.031 0.125 
  [0.048] [0.101] [0.047] [0.101] [0.024] [0.106] [0.061] [0.116] 
Cooperative -0.179
a 0.011 -0.215
a 0.066  0.01  0.038  -0.012  0.155 
  [0.063] [0.143] [0.062] [0.145] [0.032] [0.148] [0.082] [0.170] 
State  -0.016 0.062 -0.032 0.084 -0.007 0.115  0.032  0.1 
  [0.055] [0.117] [0.055] [0.118] [0.029] [0.124] [0.074] [0.144] 





  [0.086] [0.180] [0.085] [0.181] [0.044] [0.189] [0.106] [0.203] 





  [0.081] [0.175] [0.081] [0.176] [0.042] [0.183] [0.102] [0.199]   70





















16 to 100 Competitors  -0.038  0.25  -0.071  0.278
c 0.021 0.295
c -0.133 0.256 
  [0.074] [0.162] [0.073] [0.163] [0.038] [0.171] [0.092] [0.186] 
Over 100 Competitors  -0.136
c 0.236 -0.157
b 0.256  0.026  0.247 -0.230
b 0.322
c 
  [0.071] [0.158] [0.070] [0.159] [0.036] [0.167] [0.092] [0.185] 
Hazard Lambda  -0.107  -0.028  -0.116
b -0.061 
 [0.089]  [0.078]  [0.046]  [0.117] 
Observations  1229 1229 1225 1225 1118 1118  874  874 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
a significant at 1% 
 
 
Panel B: Access to finance 

















Access Dummy  0.842
b  0.652
b  0.618    
  [0.403]  [0.262]  [0.455]    




   [0.072]  [0.076]  [0.085] 
Small -0.172
b -0.165 0.120
a -0.185 -0.083  -0.06 
  [0.073] [0.123] [0.045] [0.130] [0.094] [0.163] 
Medium -0.251
a -0.008  0.065  0.047  -0.078  0.068 
  [0.069] [0.122] [0.042] [0.128] [0.092] [0.157] 
Large -0.226
a -0.086  0.064  -0.078 -0.127 -0.074 
  [0.070] [0.123] [0.041] [0.129] [0.090] [0.157] 
Very Large  -0.283
a -0.177 0.127
a -0.163 -0.064 -0.135 
  [0.074] [0.129] [0.044] [0.136] [0.094] [0.164] 





  [0.066] [0.098] [0.040] [0.102] [0.080] [0.120] 





  [0.085] [0.120] [0.051] [0.125] [0.098] [0.147] 
Corporations 0.022  -0.132  0.109
a -0.136 -0.024 -0.147 
  [0.050] [0.083] [0.030] [0.087] [0.060] [0.098] 
Cooperative -0.157
b 0.04  0.012 0.045 -0.012 0.023   71

















  [0.064] [0.108] [0.038] [0.114] [0.077] [0.129] 
State  -0.042 0.048 -0.012 0.041  0.05  0.064 
  [0.057] [0.094] [0.034] [0.100] [0.074] [0.119] 
4 to 6 Competitors  0.108  -0.168  0.101
c -0.19  -0.04 -0.131 
  [0.089] [0.151] [0.054] [0.158] [0.104] [0.174] 
7 to 15 Competitors  0.013  -0.01 0.023  -0.068 -0.1  0.111 
  [0.083] [0.142] [0.050] [0.149] [0.099] [0.163] 
16 to 100 Competitors  -0.02  -0.042  0.036  -0.062  -0.082  -0.037 
  [0.076] [0.130] [0.045] [0.137] [0.091] [0.152] 
Over 100 Competitors  -0.096  -0.124  0.046  -0.138  -0.133  -0.049 
  [0.074] [0.124] [0.044] [0.131] [0.089] [0.148] 
Hazard Lambda  -0.523
b -0.4
b -0.413 
 [0.244]  [0.158]  [0.276] 
Observations  1566 1566 1413 1413 1102 1102 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
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Table 7: Bank Financing and Firm Performance – Additional Robustness  
In Panel A, we report estimators from Propensity Score matching. The variables used to determine the propensity score are Size Dummies, Age Dummies, City Dummies, Corporation dummy, 
Collectives dummy and State Ownership dummy. The standard errors reported are bootstrapped standard errors from 50 replications. Columns 1-3 report Average Treatment Effects on the Treated 
(ATT) from the radius matching estimator and columns 4-6 report ATT from the kernel matching estimators.  
In Panel B., in column 1 we report OLS regressions similar to column 1 of Table 4 but for a reduced sample of firms which report no government help in obtaining bank finance. In columns 2-4, 2-stage 
Instrumental Variable regressions are used. The first stage regression is: Bank Dummy = α0 + β1 Collateral + β2 Government Help dummy + β3Small +  β4Medium +  β5Large +  β6Very Large + 
β7Middle-Age + β8 Old + β9Corporations + β10Collectives + β11State Ownership + β12Competition Dummies + β13City Dummies + e. The second stage is: Sales Growth = α1 + γ1BankDummy (predicted 
value from the first stage) + γ2Small +  γ3 Medium +  γ4Large +  γ5Very Large + γ6 Middle-Age + γ7 Old + γ8Corporations + γ9Collectives + γ10State Ownership + γ11Competition Dummies + γ12City 
Dummies + u.  
In Panel C, we report OLS regressions similar to Table 4 using the following specification: Sales Growth = α1 + γ1Did Not Apply for a Bank Loan+ γ2Small +  γ3 Medium +  γ4Large +  γ5Very Large + γ6 
Middle-Age + γ7 Old + γ8Corporations + γ9Collectives + γ10State Ownership + γ11Competition Dummies + γ12City Dummies + u.  
 Sales Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is the share of net profits re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Labor Productivity 
Growth is defined as the log change in productivity where labor productivity is (Sales-Total Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Labor Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002. Bank 
Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution and 0 if the firm said it had no bank loan and had no overdraft facility or line of credit. The identifying variables 
are Collateral which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the financing required a collateral or a deposit and 0 if the financing did not require collateral or if the firm did not apply for a loan 
because of stringent collateral requirements or if the firm was rejected for a loan because of the lack of collateral; and Government Help dummy which takes the value 1 if a government agency or 
official assisted the firm in obtaining bank financing.  Firm Size Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Small, Medium, Large and Very Large dummies take the value 1 if the firm is in the 
second, third, fourth or fifth quintile respectively of firm sales. Middle-age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is between 5 and 20 years of age and Old is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the firm is greater than 20 years old. Corporation Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 otherwise. Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy 
takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a Collective. State Ownership Dummy takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the company. 4 to 6 Competitors, 7 to 15 
Competitors, 16 to 100 Competitors and Over 100 Competitors are dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has the corresponding number of competitors in its main business line in the 
domestic market. The omitted category is 1 to 3 Competitors. Did Not Apply for a Bank Loan takes the value 1 if the firm reported not applying for a bank loan and 0 if the firm reported it had a bank 
loan 
 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matching. 
    1 2 3 4  5  6 
   Radius Matching  Kernel Matching 
  











rate in 2002 
Labor Productivity 
Growth [2001-2002] 
Average Treatment Effect on 
the Treated (ATT)  0.060
c  0.098
a  0.001 0.065
c  0.075
a  0.005 
  [0.036] [0.021] [0.049] [0.035]  [0.020]  [0.052] 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
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Panel B: Government Help 
  
OLS 















Instruments -  Collateral Government  Help 
Collateral and 
Government Help 
Bank Dummy  0.100
b  0.324
a 0.080  0.296
b 
 [0.0398]  [2.675]  [0.398]  [2.527] 
Observations 1799  1549  2117  1531 
R-squared  0.033     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 















Test:    -  - 
0.662  
(0.4157) 
Conditional LR (CI, p-
value)   
[ .0871,  .5726]  
(0.0074) 
[-.3283,  .4895] 
(0.6930) 
[ .0656,  .5358] 
(0.0119) 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
a significant at 1% 
 
 
Panel C: Firms that did not apply for a Bank Loan 




















   Full Sample  Drop Public Corporations and State Owned Companies 






  (0.043) (0.024) (0.066) (0.044) (0.029) (0.072) 
Observations  1432  1271 945 1048 922  736 
R-squared  0.046 0.078 0.032 0.054 0.101 0.050 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
a significant at 1%   74
Table 8: Financing Proportions of New Investments and Working Capital – 
Bank Financing versus Informal Financing 
 
The estimated model is: Sales Growth/Reinvestment Rate/Productivity Growth = α + β1Bank Financing or Self Financing1 or Self Financing2 + β2Small +  β3 Medium +  β4Large +  β5Very Large + β6 
Mid-Age + β7 Old + β8Corporations + β9Collectives + β10State Ownership + β11Competition Dummies + β12City Dummies.  
Sales Growth is defined as the log change in total sales and is computed from 2001 to 2002. Labor Productivity Growth is defined as the log change in productivity where labor productivity is (Sales-
Total Material Costs)/Total Number of Workers. Labor Productivity Growth is computed from 2001 to 2002. Reinvestment Rate is the share of net profits re-invested in the establishment in 2002. Bank 
Financing Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm said it had a loan from a bank or financial institution AND (bank financing of new investments was greater than 50% OR bank financing of working 
capital was greater than 50%). Bank Financing takes the value 0 if (the firm said it had no loan from a bank or financial institution OR said it had no overdraft facility or line of credit) AND (bank 
financing of new investments was equal to 0% AND bank financing of working capital was equal to 0%). Self Financing1 takes the value 1 if the sum of informal financing and other financing of new 
investments was greater than 50% OR the sum of informal financing and other financing of working capital was greater than 50%. Self Financing1 takes the value 0 if the sum of informal and other 
financing of new investments is equal to 0 % AND the sum of informal and other financing of working capital is equal to 0%. Self Financing2 takes the value 1 if the sum of internal, informal, family, 
and other financing of new investments was greater than 50% OR the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of working capital was greater than 50%. Self Financing2 takes the value 0 if 
the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of new investments is equal to 0 % AND the sum of internal, informal, family and other financing of working capital is equal to 0%. Firm Size 
Dummies are quintiles of total firm sales in 1999. Small, Medium, Large and Very Large dummies take the value 1 if the firm is in the second, third, fourth or fifth quintile respectively of firm sales. 
Mid-age is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is between 5 and 20 years of age and Old is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm is greater than 20 years old. Corporation 
Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a corporation (public or private) and 0 otherwise. Cooperatives/Collectives Dummy takes the value 1 if the firm is organized as a Cooperative or a 
Collective. State Ownership Dummy takes the value 1 if the state owns more than 50% of the company.  4 to 6 Competitors, 7 to 15 Competitors, 16 to 100 Competitors and Over 100 Competitors are 
dummy variables that take the value 1 if the firm has the corresponding number of competitors in its main business line in the domestic market. The omitted category is 1 to 3 Competitors. We use OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors. 
 
 
Panel A: Bank Financing 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 























b 0.045 0.052  0.074
c 0.06 
  [0.056] [0.031] [0.076] [0.058] [0.038] [0.077] 
Observations  895 809 621 659 592 480 
R-squared  0.063 0.099 0.039 0.068 0.103 0.058 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
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Panel B: Self Financing 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 












rate in 2002 
Profit 
Reinvestment 



















rate in 2002 
Profit 
Reinvestment 











(Informal+Other)  -0.04   -0.126
a  0.092     -0.026    -0.127
a   0.084  




Internal+Family )   -0.015    0.045
c   0.154
b   0.006    0.043    0.151
b 
   [0.048]    [0.024]    [0.072]    [0.058]    [0.030]    [0.075] 
Observations 1363  1372  1203  1207  952  956 984  992 874  877  719  722 
R-squared 0.056  0.055  0.110  0.103  0.041  0.042  0.06  0.058  0.111  0.104  0.048  0.05 
c significant at 10%; 
b significant at 5%; 
a significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 